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Abstract: Exogenously given reputational information is known to improve cooperation. This 
paper experimentally studies how people create such information through reporting of partner’s 
action choices, and whether the endogenous monitoring helps sustain cooperation, in an 
indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. The experiment results show that most subjects 
report their opponents’ action choices, thereby successfully cooperating with each other, when 
reporting does not involve a cost. However, subjects are strongly discouraged from reporting 
when doing so is costly. As a result, they fail to achieve strong cooperation norms when the 
reported information is privately conveyed only to their next-round interaction partner. Costly 
reporting occurs only occasionally, even when there is a public record whereby all future 
partners can check the reported information. However, groups can then foster cooperation norms 
aided by the public record, because reported information gets gradually accumulated and 
becomes more informative over time. These findings suggest that the efficacy of endogenous 
monitoring depends on the quality of platforms that store reported information.   
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1. Introduction 
Situations in which cooperation is beneficial from long-term perspectives but individuals 
have strong short-term incentives to defect are ubiquitous in real life. Public monitoring plays a 
key role to facilitate cooperation in such situations, thereby enabling the members to operate 
effective punishment strategies (e.g., Mailath and Samuelson, 2006). Reputational information 
needs to be created gradually through motivated actors’ gossiping of partners’ behaviors for 
public monitoring, as many interactions are made privately. 
The burgeoning experimental literature on cooperation in infinitely repeated dilemma 
games with random matching has largely confirmed the strong impact of exogenously given 
reputational information on sustaining cooperation (e.g., Camera and Casari, 2009; Kamei, 2017, 
Stahl, 2013; Schwartz et al., 2000).1 But where does the reputational information come from? 
There are recent successful attempts by scholars on people’s possible endogenous formation of 
reputational information, suggesting that community members can share information effectively 
and achieve high cooperation norms through voluntarily disclosing own identifiable information 
(Kamei, 2017) or acquiring partners’ history information at private costs (Duffy et al., 2013). 
However, it also suggests that gossiping alone may not be enough to do so (Camera and Casari, 
2018). In Camera and Casari (2018), allowing subjects in a laboratory to pay a cost to convey 
their partners’ actions to the partners’ next-round counterparts was not enough to improve 
cooperation, with which the authors conclude that “information about past conduct alone thus 
appears to be ineffective in overcoming coordination challenges.” However, this leaves two 
important questions unanswered. First, how does the presence of a reporting cost influence the 
effectiveness of endogenous monitoring? It is possible that their result may have been driven by 
the positive reporting cost, considering that players’ disclosure decisions have recently been 
shown to be sensitive to having a cost for the case of revealing own information (e.g., Kamei, 
2017, 2020).2 Second, what happens to people’s reporting and cooperation behaviors if there is a 
publicly available platform that stores reported information? The availability of such a platform 
may be crucial in improving cooperation, considering that online markets, such as eBay, Uber 
and Airbnb, operate feedback mechanisms with information storing property (Dellarocas, 2003).  
Gossiping has long been actively studied in the neighboring fields, such as anthropology, 
                                                 
1
 See Takahashi (2010) for theoretical work. 
2
 There was no treatment in which subjects can transmit reputational information for free in Camera and Casari 
(2018), whose aspect makes answering this question impossible in their study. 
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biology, (evolutionary) psychology and sociology, and has been discussed to help create 
reputation, thereby promoting cooperation in human societies. For example, as summarized in 
Kamei and Putterman (2018), the literature suggests that gossiping can be initiated by pro-social 
individuals when observing others’ norm violations or misdeeds, and that the gossiping activities 
are linked to emotional states of the reporters. Despite its obvious importance, however, 
surprisingly little attention has been paid to gossiping until recently in the experimental economics 
literature. In addition to Camera and Casari (2018), four more recent economic experiments 
explored the functioning of gossiping and provided useful evidence. However, these papers were 
all built on finitely repeated games unlike this paper and Camera and Casari (2018), and thus their 
focuses are different from the present paper, suggesting that most gossiping may take a form of 
cooperator-defector reporting due to other-regarding preferences in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma 
where material benefit to the reporter is absent (Kamei and Putterman, 2018), most reporting is 
truthful even when lying is possible in a trust game (Fonseca and Peters, 2018), having a third 
party who can gossip boosts trust and trustworthiness in a trust game, driven by the mere fact of 
being observed by others (Fehr and Sutter, 2019)3, information transmission through subjective 
ratings may not raise transfer and return rates in a trust game (Abrahama et al., 2016). This paper 
aims to contribute to not only the experiment literature in infinitely repeated dilemma games, but 
also the literature on reputation, by providing new experimental evidence that reporting behaviors 
may be severely deterred by the presence of a positive reporting cost even in long-term 
interactions with multiple equilibria and that the efficiency of monitoring may strongly depend on 
the availability of a platform that stores reported information.  
In the experiment, recruited subjects play an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
game under random matching. In each main treatment, subjects are given an opportunity to 
report their matched partners’ action choices to the partners’ future partners. Four main 
treatments are constructed by varying two factors (2×2 factorial design). The first factor is the 
size of the reporting cost: either reporting is free or costly. The second factor is the information 
structure: either reported action choice is informed to the partner’s next interaction partner only 
or to all future partners. 
The experimental results show that while cooperation is easily collapsed when 
endogenous monitoring is not possible, subjects can achieve strong cooperation norms if they 
                                                 
3 See also Kamei (2018) for the impact of high visibility. This channel is absent in the present study since a third 
party is not introduced (see the experimental design). 
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can report another’s action for free. Remarkably, the strong impact of endogenous monitoring 
does not depend on whether the community has a publicly available platform that stores reported 
information. By sharp contrast, the efficiency of monitoring does depend on the information 
structure under costly reporting. On the one hand, endogenous monitoring has almost no effect if 
subjects can convey with a cost their partners’ action choices to the partners’ next-round partners 
only, as is similar to the finding of Camera and Casari (2018). However, on the other hand, it has 
a strong positive effect if there is the publicly available platform of reputational information, 
because subjects can then gradually accumulate information and they can refer to all the 
previously reported behaviors of their matched partners when deciding on an action. This 
underscores the beneficial effect of storing reputational information when reporting is costly. 
Further, a structural estimation suggests that subjects’ strategy choices were severely affected by 
the endogenous monitoring institutions. For example, a large fraction of subjects are estimated to 
have cooperated conditionally upon their matched partners’ reputations in the experiment. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design. 
Section 3 discusses theoretical discussions and computer simulation exercises on possible 
evolutions of cooperation. Section 4 reports the experiment results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Experimental design 
This study designs an infinitely repeated game based on a random termination rule. A 
multiple-supergame design is adopted to allow subjects to learn and update strategy choices (e.g., 
Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2018): subjects can play an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
games with random matching up to six times.4 An “indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
game” is also called a supergame in this paper (it was called a “phase” in the instructions 
distributed to subjects). Subjects are randomly assigned to a group of eight at the beginning of 
each supergame, and the group composition does not change within the supergame.5  
Within a given supergame, each subject is randomly paired with another member in their 
group in every round. Since the group size is eight, the probability that a subject will interact 
                                                 
4
 An additional requirement is set so that the duration of interactions is up to 2 hours in total, to avoid having a too 
lengthy experiment session (which could contaminate data due to fatigue of subjects). Most sessions (11 out of the 
16 sessions) went over all the six supergames, however.  
5
 A larger group size was selected compared with Camera and Casari (2009) and Kamei (2017) where the group size 
was four, since this study considers large-scale economies (e.g., online platforms) where information does not 
automatically spread among community members without reporting. Responding to this design choice, a Markov 
transition matrix and equilibrium conditions were derived as summarized in Section 3 and online Appendix A.1. 
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with a specific group member in a round is one-seventh (they do not interact with those outside 
their groups within a supergame). Subjects’ interactions are anonymous in the sense that they do 
not know their partners’ IDs. However, they learn the partners’ action choices in prior rounds in 
which they were reported. Neither their decisions nor their interaction outcomes in the past affect 
the matching process. The duration of each supergame is not pre-determined: subjects’ 
interactions in a given supergame will end (continue) with a probability of 5% (95%).6  The 
expected length of each supergame is therefore 20 (= 1/(1−.95)). The payoff matrix of the stage 
game is shown in Fig. 1.  
 Fig. 1: Payoff Matrix of the Stage Game 
  
Player 2 
 
 cooperate defect 
Player 1 cooperate 25, 25 5, 30 
defect 30, 5 10,10 
Note: This matrix was used in Camera and Casari (2009) and Kamei (2017). Their studies used a group size of four. 
 
Group assignment across the supergames follows the standard random matching protocol. 
Specifically, once a given supergame is over, all groups are dissolved in the session, and subjects 
are randomly assigned to a group of eight in the following supergame. Any information from a 
given supergame is not carried over to a future supergame.  
This experiment consists of five treatments. The first treatment, denoted as the “No 
Reporting” treatment (dubbed “N”), serves as a control condition. Subjects play the 
aforementioned interactions without any information revelation, subject to the random termination 
rule. In each round, subjects just learn that they are randomly matched with one of the seven 
members in their groups. The other four treatments allow subjects to report (gossip) their own 
partner’s action choice (cooperate or defect) to that person’s future partner[s]. For the sake of 
simplicity, subjects’ reporting is set to be always truthful.7  
 
2.1. The Four Reporting Treatments  
In every round, each subject can report their partner’s action choice to that person’s 
                                                 
6
 An integer between 1 and 100 is randomly drawn at the end of each round. If it is less than (greater than or equal 
to) 96, subjects have (do not have) the next round.  
7
 This design piece was used also in Camera and Casari (2018) and Kamei and Putterman (2018). Fonseca and 
Peters (2018) found that even without any material incentives, most trustors reported truthful information about their 
matched trustees as gossips in a trust game when their messages did not need to be objective. 
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future partner(s) in a given supergame. The treatment conditions are designed using a 2  2 
factorial design by varying two dimensions (Table 1). The first dimension is the presence of a 
cost that a subject must pay to report; reporting is either cost-free or costly. Notice that reporting 
may not be considered free in reality since individuals need to incur the time (opportunity cost) 
or effort to warn others. In the costly reporting condition, if a subject reports her partner’s action 
choice in a given round, one point will be deducted from her payoff at the end of that round. If 
the subject does not report it, no points will be deducted.  
The second dimension is the consequence of reporting. In the “Minimum” condition, if a 
subject reports her partner’s action choice in round t, only that partner’s round t + 1 interaction 
counterpart will be informed of the choice before deciding how to act. This condition was used in 
Camera and Casari (2018) and Kamei and Putterman (2018). In the “Full” condition, by contrast, 
if a subject reports her partner’s action choice in round t, all future counterparts of this partner 
will learn her choice in round t. 
The four main treatments are called the “Free Reporting, Minimum” (F-Min), “Costly 
Reporting, Minimum” (C-Min), “Free Reporting, Full” (F-Full), and “Costly Reporting, Full” 
(C-Full) treatments. 
 
2.2. Using a Block Design to Collect a Large Number of Observations 
 Considering that infinite repetition is designed using a random termination rule, a block 
design is employed in order to collect enough observations in each supergame (Fréchette and 
Yuksel, 2017).8 In each supergame, subjects play blocks of ten rounds in sequence. That is, they 
will play ten rounds, assuming the random termination rule already described. In a given round, 
each subject will randomly be paired with a member in their group and will interact with each 
other. However, they will not be informed of an integer randomly drawn in each round until the 
end of the tenth round in a given block. After the tenth round, subjects will be informed of integers 
randomly drawn for all the 10 rounds. Subjects’ payoffs are determined based on rounds before 
the round when an integer more than 95 is first realized.9  
 
                                                 
8
 Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) showed that subjects’ behaviors under the block design do not differ from those under 
the standard random termination first used by Roth and Murnighan (1978).  
9
 For example, suppose that the ten randomly drawn integers were: 4, 34, 98, 56, 32, 93, 2, 45, 14, and 32 in 
sequence. In this situation, subjects’ total payoffs in the supergame will be calculated based on the interaction 
outcomes until the 3rd round in this block (the interaction outcomes from the fourth round will not be counted in 
calculating total payoff), and they will move on to the next supergame. By contrast, if the ten integers are all less 
than 96, then subjects will move on to the next block in the same supergame. 
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2.3. Experimental Procedure 
16 sessions were conducted in the EXEC laboratory at the University of York in the 
United Kingdom from July through November in 2018 (Table 1). A total of 360 students 
participated in the experiment. All the subjects were recruited by solicitation messages sent 
through hroot (Bock et al., 2014). No subjects participated in more than one session. No 
communication among the subjects was allowed after entering the laboratory and before the 
experiment ended. The experiment, except the instructions, was programmed using the zTree 
software (Fischbacher, 2007). Only neutrally-framed words were used in the instructions (any 
loaded words, such as cooperate and defect, were avoided) – see online Appendix C. The 
instructions were read aloud by the researcher. Subjects were also asked to answer a few control 
questions to check their understanding of the experiment at the start of each session. The 
conversion rate was 150 points in the experiment to one pound sterling. 
 Table 1: Summary of Treatments 
Treatment 
Available history information on 
round t partner before choosing an 
action in round t 
Cost of 
reporting 
# of 
subjects 
(sessions) 
# of obs. 
Avg. SG 
length 
[rounds] 
N n.a. n.a. 72 (3) 9,120 21.11 
F-Min Round t partner’s action choices 
made in round t – 1 if he was 
reported in that round 
0 points 88 (4)#1 7,336 23.33 
C-Min 1 point 64 (3) 10,080 16.98 
F-Full Round t partner’s action choices made in all past rounds up to round t 
– 1 in a given supergame in which he 
was reported by his group members 
0 points 72 (3) 10,320 23.89 
C-Full 1 point 64 (3) 6,480 15.00 
Total   360 (16) 43,336         20.06  
Notes: #1 Four sessions were conducted for the F-Min treatment because one session was not able to be completed 
(one subject withdrew the experiment in the middle of the session). 
 
3. Theoretical Discussions on Subjects’ Behaviors  
One instance of defection could quickly spread across a given group under random 
matching if the members act according to discriminating strategies (e.g., Kandori, 1992; Ellison, 
1994). This contagious process makes cooperation difficult to evolve unless the continuation 
probability is large enough. Considering that the group composition is fixed in the experiment, 
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such contagion and a possible evolution of cooperation can theoretically be studied using a 
Markov transition matrix, assuming that all the members act according to the grim trigger strategy 
(see Camera and Casari (2009) when the group size is four).10 Appendix A.1.1 shows the transition 
matrix and the harmful contagious process identified when the group size is eight in the N 
treatment. As detailed in the Appendix, however, if the strategy set is restricted to only two: the 
grim trigger strategy and the always defect strategy, there are no material incentives for any 
member in the experiment to deviate from the grim trigger strategy, provided that all the other 
members follow the same trigger strategy. The threshold probability above which players have no 
profitable deviation from the grim trigger strategy, *, is 0.574 (Appendix A.1.1), while the 
continuation probability used in the experiment is 0.95. This suggests that under this assumption, 
not only mutual defection but also mutual cooperation holds as an equilibrium outcome, even 
when no reputational information is available. Having this said, theoretical predictions under 
random matching are complex and not sharp. For example, a player who was betrayed in a given 
round would, if allowed, refrain from engaging in punishment unlike described by the grim trigger 
strategy (i.e., would deviate to choosing cooperation in the next round under certain conditions) 
because such a deviation helps delay the propagation of defection to other group members.  must 
be less than 0.84 to avoid such deviation in the off-equilibrium path (see Appendix A.1.2 for the 
detail). Hence, following the grim trigger strategy is not an equilibrium in the experiment once 
players are allowed to select any strategy. It is also worth noting that the number of possible 
strategies in the infinitely repeated environment is not finite. 
The complexity of the standard theory to predict behavior also holds for the four 
reporting treatments. However, while the reporting treatments are identical to the N treatment if 
no one engages in reporting, reputational information could encourage more cooperative choices 
if reporting does occur. Notice that uncooperative actions are more contagious in the reporting 
treatments than in the N treatment if it is assumed that (a) some members engage in reporting 
and (b) group members act according to a strict grim trigger strategy (e.g., members start to 
defect unconditionally in all future rounds, as soon as they learn from reported information that 
their matched partners defected in the past, or the partners defect towards them now) – see 
Camera and Casari (2009) and Kamei (2017). This means that * (the threshold value for the 
continuation probabilities that encourage players to select the strict trigger strategy in the 
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 Also see Duffy and Ochs (2009). 
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equilibrium path) is not greater in the reporting treatments than in the N treatment. The lower 
threshold value may mean that players have more incentives to refrain from behaving 
uncooperatively with than without reporting. 
 Summary 1: Cooperation can be sustained at a higher level with than without reporting. 
 Recent experiments, however, suggest that theoretical analyses based on such grim 
trigger strategies may not be accurate. For example, Dal Bó and Frechétte (2011) estimated the 
distribution of subjects’ strategy choices under partner matching, showing that the tit for tat 
strategy is the most frequently adopted cooperative strategy while the grim trigger strategy is not 
common.11 Kamei (2017) studied subjects’ behaviors when they had an option to hide IDs in an 
indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with random matching. His experiment revealed 
that the subjects’ average behaviors are characterized by conditional cooperative strategies. For 
example, he showed that the higher fraction of cooperation her partner had in his reputational 
information, the more likely a subject was to choose cooperation.12  
In order to accommodate the findings of these related studies and also to discuss possible 
treatment differences in great depth, a large simulation analysis was additionally performed by 
assuming that some group members engage in reporting and act according to a conditional 
cooperative strategy – CC players hereafter (while the rest follow the “always defect” strategy – 
AD players hereafter).13 In the simulation, for simplicity, the strategy space is restricted only to the 
conditional cooperative strategy and AD strategy. While the simulation shows the presence of the 
symmetric cooperation situation where every group member selects cooperation in the equilibrium 
path under all five treatment conditions, clear treatment differences emerged (Appendix A.2). 
First, mutual cooperation is difficult to sustain in the N treatment.14 As shown in Appendix A.2.1, 
                                                 
11
 The distribution of subjects’ strategy choices were estimated in our paper, using the approach taken by Dal Bó and 
Frechétte (2011). As discussed in Section 4, the grim trigger strategy was also infrequently adopted by our subjects. 
12
 People’s use of such discriminatory strategies is an established phenomenon also in finitely repeated dilemma 
games such as public goods games (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Kamei, 2020). 
13
 The always defect strategy – the strategy where the subject selects defection unconditionally – is commonly 
observed even under partner matching. For example, Dal Bó and Frechétte (2011) estimated that the tit for tat and 
AD strategies together can account for 80 percent of all the data. In our simulation, for simplicity, the AD players 
are assumed to always report when doing so is free, considering the high efficiency of reputational information seen 
in the prior studies (e.g., Camera and Casari, 2009; Stahl, 2013; Kamei, 2017). However, it is assumed that the AD 
players do not engage in reporting when it is costly since they can free ride on others’ reporting. Kamei and 
Putterman (2018), in a two-period prisoner’s dilemma game environment, found that defectors are more selfish than 
cooperators in deciding whether to report: the former almost never engaged in reporting when reporting was costly. 
14
 The simulation assumes that CC players stochastically select cooperation based on their own experiences in the N 
treatment (i.e., with a probability that their partners selected cooperation so far) – see Appendix A.2.1. 
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the cooperative equilibrium is volatile because defection spreads quickly to all members as soon 
as more than one player deviates from the cooperative strategy. Recall that as discussed in 
footnote 13, a non-negligible fraction of players are known to behave according to the AD 
strategy, either due to their tastes or errors, in this kind of indefinitely repeated dilemma 
interaction. The simulated pattern in the N treatment is consistent with the prior finding that 
cooperation tends to stay at low levels without reputational information.15 Second, however, 
reputational information does help prevent such a breakdown of cooperation (Appendices A.2.2 
and A.2.3).16 This is consistent with Summary 1 discussed based on the standard theory. Having 
this said, the effectiveness of endogenous monitoring does depend on the reporting cost and the 
information structure. On the one hand, the symmetric cooperation situation is very stable when 
reporting does not involve a cost. This holds both for the F-Min and F-Full treatments, regardless 
of what conditional cooperative strategy is considered. For example, a simulation result indicates 
that a player in the F-Min treatment has material incentives to follow a conditional cooperative 
strategy (rather than the AD strategy) under reasonable assumptions, unless more than the majority 
of her group members act according to the AD strategy (Appendix A.2.2). Having a public 
platform that stores previously reported information in the F-Full treatment strengthens the 
stability of the cooperative equilibrium further (Appendix A.2.3). These positive effects are driven 
by the large quantity of reported information, thereby enabling CC players to accurately 
discriminate members based on observable peers’ cooperation history. Hence, a player is deterred 
from behaving uncooperatively for future material concerns. 
On the other hand, the impact of endogenous monitoring may be weak under costly 
reporting due to the smaller size of reported information. As detailed in Appendices A.2.2 and 
A.2.3, the simulation suggests that cooperation can be sustained at a high level in the C-Min 
treatment if players select actions as their partners’ reputational information indicates, like a parrot 
(e.g., a player selects cooperation if her partner selected cooperation in the last round and it is 
                                                 
15
 The average cooperation rate when the group size was four was 59.5% in Camera and Casari (2009) and 33.4% in 
Kamei (2017), when no reputational information was available. It is worth noting that sustaining cooperation is 
theoretically more difficult when the group size is eight than four.  
16
 Simulations were performed based on two simplest assumptions for CC players. The first one is to assume that 
CC players select cooperation (defection) in round t if their current-round partners selected cooperation (defection) 
in round t – 1 and the action was observable. This assumes that they use the history information as a coordination 
device but they do not consider their interaction experiences in the past. The second one is to assume that CC 
players adjust action choices over time such that they select cooperation in round t stochastically based on all their 
relevant prior interaction experiences. Specifically, they mimic how previous unmasked partners selected 
cooperation towards themselves up to round t – 1 (see the Appendix in the detail). CC players’ behaviors in a 
laboratory can be considered somewhere in the middle between the two extreme assumptions. 
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observable). Such information effects as a coordination device are stronger in the C-Full than in 
the C-Min treatments.17 However, the positive effects diminish if players take own prior 
interaction experiences into account and then adjust their cooperation decisions, instead of simply 
relying on the tit-for-tat-like strategy. This is because such adjustments create mis-coordination 
among CC-players, meaning that the impact of reported information becomes weaker compared 
with the parrot-like approach.18 
 Summary 2: (a) Cooperation can be sustained at a higher level when subjects can report for 
free, compared with the N treatment. (b) The impact of costly reporting is weaker compared to 
free reporting. (c) The level of cooperation is higher in the C-Full (F-Full) treatment, aided by 
the public record of accumulated reported information, than in the C-Min (F-Min) treatment. 
 
 These simulations assume that CC players engage in reporting irrespective of the reporting 
cost, since the reporting cost is just one point. It is worth noting that they may be reluctant to 
report partners’ actions in the costly reporting treatments, even though the reporting cost is the 
lowest positive amount and interactions are infinitely repeated. Kamei (2017), in the context of 
voluntary disclosure of own information, demonstrated that people may have a discontinuity in 
disclosure behaviors between zero and positive costs (also see Abraham et al. [2016], Kamei 
[2020], Kamei and Putterman [2018], and Shampanier et al. [2007] for evidence under finite 
repetition). In order to explore possible heterogeneity in subjects’ reporting, a structural estimation 
of reporting strategy choices will be performed using the experiment data in Section 4.4. 
4. Experiment Results 
An overview of subjects’ cooperation rates and the effects of the endogenous monitoring 
institutions is given in Section 4.1. Subjects’ reporting behaviors are carefully examined in 
Section 4.2. Lastly, as driving forces behind the observed treatment differences, a relationship 
between reputational information and subjects’ cooperation decisions and a structural estimation 
result of subjects’ strategy choices are discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively.  
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 The positive effects of costly reporting are nevertheless smaller compared with free reporting, since players’ 
ability to discriminate peers are lower under costly than free reporting due to the smaller size of the reported 
information in the Min condition (Appendix Figs. A.2, A.3, A.6 and A.7). 
18
 In the context of an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with partner matching, Axelrod and Hamilton 
(1981) demonstrated that a simple tit for tat strategy works better than any strategy (e.g., sophisticated strategies 
based on the Markov process and Bayesian inference) in sustaining cooperation in computer simulations. 
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4.1. Treatment Differences 
 A first view of the effects of endogenous monitoring is given by Fig. 2. The average 
cooperation rates were calculated based on data from round 1 in supergames, the first block in 
supergames, and all supergames, respectively, as the random termination rule was adopted in this 
study (e.g. Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2018).19 Three clear patterns were found. First, subjects’ 
cooperation rates were modest when reporting was not possible (panel i). For example, the 
average cooperation rate in the N treatment was 46.5% in round 1 and 35.2% when data from all 
rounds are used. A higher cooperation rate in round 1 than in later rounds suggests that some 
subjects turned to punishment mode for some duration after negative experiences. Having said 
this, the average cooperation rate in the first block was 33.9%, whose level was similar to that 
when all data are used. This implies that communities’ cooperation dynamics became settled 
quickly to some stable patterns within a supergame. 
Second, endogenous monitoring had a strong effect on improving cooperation if reporting 
did not involve a cost, regardless of whether reported action choices were observed by the next 
partner only (F-Min) or by all future partners (F-Full). A comparison between the two free 
reporting treatments shows a positive effect of having larger history information – however, the 
effect is small. The average cooperation rates in round 1 (over all rounds) were 67.7% (49.7%) in 
the F-Min versus 71.8% (58.2%) in the F-Full treatment. This suggests that subjects chose 
actions in round t mainly based on the information from the immediate previous round, i.e., 
round t – 1.  
Third, however, the effects of costly reporting clearly depend on the information 
structure. Costly reporting has only mild effects in the C-Min treatment: while the average 
cooperation rate was higher in the C-Min than in the N treatment, the difference was not 
significant (panel i). This result is similar to Camera and Casari (2018) in the context of an 
indefinitely repeated helping game. By sharp contrast, costly reporting significantly improved 
cooperation in the C-Full treatment, relative to the N treatment (panel ii). Especially, the round 1 
cooperation rate in the C-Full treatment was 65.6%, only somewhat lower than the rate in the F-
Full treatment. Having this said, cooperation was sustained better in the F-Full than in the C-Full 
treatment, as seen in the average cooperation rates in the first block and from all rounds. These 
findings seem to suggest that on average, the larger quantity of information created through 
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 Data are balanced across the treatments if observations in the first round or from the first block are used since 
subjects in all the treatments went through the first ten rounds of each supergame thanks to the block design. 
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endogenous monitoring, the more persistently cooperation is sustained at high levels, if it is 
assumed that the quantity of reported information would be larger in the F-Full, followed by C-
Full and then C-Min (whose assumption turns out to be correct as studied in Section 4.2). 
 Result 1: (a) Endogenous monitoring improved cooperation when reporting did not involve a 
cost, irrespective of whether reported action choices were conveyed to any future partners. 
However, (b) costly reporting did not significantly improve cooperation in the C-Min treatment. 
By contrast, (c) costly reporting did improve cooperation in the C-Full treatment, aided by the 
public platform whereby all future partners can check reported information.   
 
 Fig. 2: Average Cooperation Rate by Treatment 
   
 
Notes: p-values (two-sided) were calculated based on subject random effects probit regressions with robust 
bootstrapped standard errors (300 replications). In the regressions, the length of previous supergame was controlled as 
an independent variable for observations after the first supergame while having a dummy which equals 1 for the first 
supergame (which makes it possible to control for cooperation behaviors without prior experiences). *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
 The impact of endogenous monitoring is also evident for subjects’ across-supergame 
cooperation dynamics. However, the trends reveal new insights (Fig. 3). First, the supergame-
average cooperation rate decreased from supergame to supergame in the N treatment. The 
decrease rate was on average significant (see columns (2) and (3) of Appendix Table B.1). This 
suggests that in the absence of reputational information, subjects learned to behave 
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uncooperatively when they gained experience. Second, however, free reporting has a strong 
effect on improving cooperation uniformly across the six supergames. The round 1 average 
cooperation rates were around 70% consistently across the experiment, whether in the F-Min or 
F-Full treatment, meaning that subjects’ high willingness to cooperate persisted over time 
(panels I.i and II.i). While there are no clear trends if the data after round 1 are incorporated 
(panels ii and iii), groups achieved significantly stronger cooperation norms with the endogenous 
monitoring compared with the N treatment, whether the data only from earlier supergames 
(supergames 1 to 3) or from later supergames (supergames 4 to 6) are used.20 
Third, Fig. 3 reveals different dynamics between the information structures under costly 
reporting. On the one hand, panel I of the figure suggests that costly reporting has only mild 
effects similarly across the six supergames in the C-Min treatment, strengthening Result 1(b). As 
shown in Appendix Fig. B.1, the effect was not significant, regardless of which data are 
considered: the first or second half of the experiment. However, on the other hand, subjects on 
average improved cooperation from supergame to supergame in the C-Full treatment. The increase 
rate was significant (see the coefficient estimates for the supergame number variable in Appendix 
Table B.1). In addition, groups in the C-Full treatment achieved significantly higher cooperation 
rates, compared with the N treatment, in the second three supergames, although not in the first 
three supergames (Appendix Fig. B.1). This suggests that in the C-Full treatment, subjects 
gradually learned how to utilize a public record that stores reported information. It is reasonable 
that such learning took time considering that only a subset of actions were reported and the 
distribution of information may be biased. As will be discussed in Section 4.2, subjects’ reporting 
rates were far less than 50% in the C-Full treatment, which is only somewhat higher than in the C-
Min treatment. 
 Result 2: (a) Average cooperation rates decreased from supergame to supergame in the N 
treatment. (b) Endogenous monitoring significantly improved cooperation across the six 
supergames in the F-Min and F-Full treatments. (c) Costly reporting did not improve 
cooperation regardless of which supergames to be considered in the C-Min treatment. However, 
(d) in the C-Full treatment, costly reporting gradually improved cooperation from supergame 
                                                 
20
 Treatment differences were calculated as identified in Fig. 2, when using the data only from supergames 1 to 3, 
and also when using the data only from supergames 4 to 6. As shown in Appendix Fig. B.1, in each subset of the 
data the difference in the average cooperation rate is significant between the N and F-Min treatments, regardless of 
which rounds of plays are used (round 1 only, the first block only, or all rounds). The same also holds for a 
comparison between the N and F-Full treatments. 
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and supergame, and the subjects achieved a significantly higher cooperation rate in the second 
half of the experiment relative to the N treatment.    
 
 As touched upon earlier, the average cooperation rate was higher in round 1 than in later 
rounds in all the treatments (Fig. 2). A regression confirms that subjects’ average cooperation 
rates gradually declined over time within supergames in all five treatments (Appendix Table 
B.1). This suggests that subjects on average behaved conditionally cooperatively or being in 
punishment mode for some duration after having some negative experiences, thereby gradually 
weakening cooperation. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 will be devoted to analyzing what strategies 
subjects took in the experiment. 
 Fig. 3: Average Cooperation Rate, Supergame by Supergame 
  
 
I. C-Min and F-Min treatments 
  
 
II. C-Full and F-Full treatments 
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4.2. Reporting 
 It was discussed that costly reporting did not improve cooperation in the C-Min treatment 
(Result 1.b). This result can be explained by the small size of reputational information. Table 2 
reports subjects’ reporting rate by treatment. It shows that subjects were less likely to engage in 
reporting in the C-Min than in the F-Min treatment. The difference in the reporting rate is huge, 
around 50%. The strong negative impact of a positive reporting cost is remarkable, considering 
that the cost is only one point (= 0.67 pence). This is, however, consistent with the results of 
recent research that showed players’ sensitivity to having a cost in the context of voluntary 
disclosure of own information (e.g., Kamei, 2017, 2020). Table 2 also indicates that the presence 
of reporting costs significantly undermined reporting also in the Full condition, suggesting that 
the strong negative impact of having a cost is a robust finding. 
The subjects’ reporting behavior on average did not differ by the information condition 
when reporting did not involve a cost (see again Table 2). This implies that perhaps, having a 
publicly available platform as in the Full condition did not improve material incentives to report 
provided that reporting is cost-free since already more than 70% of subjects chose to report even 
in the Min condition. This also implies that subjects might have weighed the latest-round 
experiences (available already in the Min condition) far more than earlier ones in deciding which 
action to take.  
However, subjects were significantly more likely to engage in reporting in the C-Full 
than in the C-Min treatment, while their reporting behaviors in the former were still much 
weaker compared with the F-Full treatment. In the C-Full treatment, as already discussed, 
communities were able to gradually accumulate information on members’ reported action 
choices unlike in the C-Min treatment. Recall that subjects in the C-Full treatment achieved quite 
strong cooperation norms (Section 4.1). It seems that the presence of a public record accessible 
to group members raised material benefits of reporting acts and thus helped deter uncooperative 
behaviors in the group despite the modest reporting rates in the C-Full treatment, well explaining 
the difference between Results 1(b) and (c).  
 Result 3: (a) Subjects were significantly more likely to engage in reporting in the F-Min (F-Full) 
than in the C-Min (C-Full) treatment. (b) Subjects’ reporting rates were at high levels similarly 
for the F-Min and F-Full treatments. (c) Subjects’ reporting rates were significantly higher in the 
C-Full than in the C-Min treatment.   
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Table 2: Average Reporting Rates by Treatment 
 
 
Data used for calculations 
  Round 1 
 
First block 
 
All rounds 
                           reporting: 
  information: 
costly 
 
free costly 
 
free costly 
 
free 
Min 28.1% <*** 76.0%  23.5% <*** 72.6%  20.7% <*** 71.7% 
 ˄**  =  ˄*  =  ˄**  = 
Full 41.9% <*** 74.0%  30.8% <*** 74.2%  28.4% <*** 77.5% 
Notes: Each treatment comparison was made based on a subject random effects probit regression with robust bootstrapped 
standard errors (300 replications), while having a treatment dummy as an independent variable. In the regressions, the 
length of previous supergame was controlled as an independent variable for observations after the first supergame while 
having a dummy which equals 1 for the first supergame.   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 
level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
Online Appendix Fig. B.2 reports the average reporting rates, supergame by supergame. 
It reveals that subjects’ strong reporting behaviors in the F-Min and F-Full treatments were seen 
in the very first supergame and then persisted throughout the six supergames. This implies that 
perhaps, there were material benefits of endogenous monitoring to the reporters if reporting did 
not involve a cost. This trend is parallel to Result 2(b).  
Fig. B.2 also interestingly reveals that while the supergame-average reporting rate 
increased only to a small degree across the six supergames, the round 1 reporting rate increased 
significantly from supergame to supergame, in the C-Full treatment (panel i). This supports the 
idea that subjects gradually learn the benefit of having a platform that stores reported 
information. Recall that in the C-Full treatment, in the earlier rounds a subject invests in 
reporting, the higher benefit she will receive from the reputational information since the 
community members including her can refer to the information in any future rounds after 
reporting is made. It is also worth noting that the increasing trend of subjects’ round 1 reporting 
rates in the C-Full treatment is parallel to Result 2(d) and Fig. 3.II. This implies that subjects’ 
reporting behaviors were closely linked to the level of cooperation norms fostered in their 
community. 
A detailed look at subjects’ reporting by stage game outcome reveals three future 
interesting patterns. First, cooperators were more likely than defectors to engage in reporting 
under each treatment condition, whether they were matched with cooperators or defectors. The 
differences in the reporting rate between the cooperators and defectors are statistically significant 
for almost all comparisons (Table 3). This implies that some defectors might not have 
appreciated the benefits of creating reputational information and/or might have free ridden on 
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cooperators’ reporting behaviors.  
Second, cooperators were more likely to choose to report when matched with defectors, 
rather than cooperators, when reporting was costly (panels i and iii). The differences were 
significant in the C-Full treatment. This result may mean that cooperators’ reporting was partly 
driven by other-regarding motives or emotional responses. This pattern is consistent with Kamei 
and Putterman (2018) who studied costly reporting in a one-shot two-period model. However, 
unlike Kamei and Putterman (2018), cooperators in the present study did engage in reporting 
also when interacted with cooperators. In Kamei and Putterman (2018), cooperator-cooperator 
reporting was less than 10%. By contrast, it on average occurred more than 30% of the time in 
the C-Min treatment, and around 40% of the time in the C-Full treatment. The difference in the 
result can be attributed to the difference in the design: subjects in the present study repeated 
interactions indefinitely with a very high probability, 95%, thereby making reporting of 
cooperators potentially helpful for communities’ maintenance of cooperation norms. 
Third, both cooperators and defectors frequently engaged in reporting when reporting did 
not involve a cost. However, not everyone did so in the F-Min and F-Full treatments. This result 
is not surprising considering that some people are known to behave uncooperatively even though 
a Pareto-dominant cooperative equilibrium exists in an infinitely repeated dilemma game.21  
 
Table 3: Average Reporting Rates by Stage Game Outcome 
(i) C-Min treatment 
 Data used for calculations 
 Round 1  First block  All rounds 
     decision-maker: 
partner: 
cooperator 
 
defector 
 
cooperator 
 
defector 
 
cooperator 
 
defector 
cooperator 31.5% = 19.1%  36.6% >*** 19.1%  35.5% >*** 17.7% 
 
=  =  =  ˅***  =  ˅*** 
defector 47.9% >** 8.3%   42.4% >*** 9.4%   38.6% >*** 7.6% 
(ii) F-Min treatment 
 Data used for calculations 
 Round 1  First block  All rounds 
     decision-maker: 
partner: 
cooperator 
 
defector 
 
cooperator 
 
defector 
 
cooperator 
 
defector 
cooperator 86.3% >** 59.0% 
 
86.5% >*** 67.3% 
 
87.2% >*** 66.0% 
 
= 
 
= 
 
˅** 
 
˅* 
 
˅*** 
 
= 
defector 82.1% = 54.3%   77.6% >*** 55.3%   75.6% >*** 57.5% 
                                                 
21
 Some subjects’ decision not to report their partners’ actions in the F-Min and F-Full treatments may have been 
caused by their limited cognitive ability as discussed in Arruñada and Casari (2016) and Kamei (2020). 
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(iii) C-Full treatment 
 Data used for calculations 
 Round 1  First block  All rounds 
     decision-maker: 
partner: 
cooperator 
 
defector 
 
cooperator 
 
defector 
 
cooperator 
 
defector 
cooperator 48.9% >*** 13.9%  38.6% >*** 17.8%  39.2% >** 18.0% 
 
˄***  =  ˄***  =  ˄***  ˅* 
defector 77.8% >* 11.7%   59.8% >*** 17.0%   56.2% >*** 14.4% 
(iv) F-Full treatment 
 Data used for calculations 
 Round 1  First block  All rounds 
     decision-maker: 
partner: 
cooperator 
 
defector 
 
cooperator 
 
defector 
 
cooperator 
 
defector 
cooperator 82.0% >*** 44.8%  84.8% >*** 52.9%  86.3% >*** 57.9% 
 
=  =  =  ˄***  =  ˄*** 
defector 85.1% = 9.7%#1   79.7% >** 69.2%   79.3%  = 73.6% 
Notes: Each treatment comparison was made based on a subject random effects probit regression with robust bootstrapped 
standard errors (300 replications), while having a treatment dummy as the independent variable. In the regressions, the 
length of previous supergame was controlled as an independent variable for observations after the first supergame while 
having a dummy which equals 1 for the first supergame.  
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
 Appendix Table B.2 supplements Table 3 by calculating the average reporting rates by 
supergame. One aspect of the C-Full treatment is worthwhile remarking. It was discussed earlier 
that subjects’ round 1 reporting rate increased significantly from supergame to supergame in the 
C-Full treatment. The appendix table reveals that this increase was driven by an increase in 
cooperator-cooperator reporting. In this treatment, cooperator-cooperator reporting was at low 
levels in the first two supergames (18.8% and 26.9% in the first and second supergames, 
respectively). However, it occurred 56% to 68% of the time for the third to sixth supergames. 
This implies that cooperators learned the benefits of reporting cooperators for future mutual 
cooperation purpose gradually over time.22 
One may wonder how subjects’ reporting was affected by others’ previous reporting. It is 
possible that their reporting activities may partly be characterized by conditional behaviors. For 
example, a reciprocal subject may be more likely to engage in reporting to help community 
members, if she receives larger information for the current-round partner than otherwise.23 In 
                                                 
22
 Cooperator-defector reporting was very frequent from the very first supergame in the C-Full treatment (Table B.2). 
23
 People’s conditional behaviors were widely documented in the experimental literature, for example in decisions to 
cooperate (Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2010), direct punishment (Kamei, 2014) and third party punishment 
(Kamei, 2018). 
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order to explore possible conditional reporting, partial correlations between subjects’ reporting 
decisions and the quantity of their received information were calculated, confirming significantly 
positive relationships (Table 4). Subjects in the C-Min and F-Min treatments were on average 
more likely to report by around 17.4 and 10.7 percentage points, respectively, when they received 
a report than otherwise. In the C-Full and F-Full treatments, a 10% increase in a subject i’s 
quantity of reported information raises the likelihood that her current-round partner reports i by 
around 1.3 and 1.4 percentage points, respectively. 
 Result 4: (a) Cooperators were more likely than defectors to engage in reporting under each 
treatment condition. (b) Cooperator-defector reporting was more common than in any other case 
when reporting is costly. (c) Cooperator-cooperator reporting was more frequently observed 
compared with Kamei and Putterman (2018). (d) Both cooperators and defectors frequently 
engaged in reporting when reporting did not involve a cost. (e) Subjects’ reporting activities were 
positively correlated with their matched partners’ frequencies of being reported in the past. 
 
Table 4: Partial Correlations between Received Information and Reporting 
(A) C-Min and F-Min treatments 
 C-Min F-Min 
 First block 
(1) 
All rounds 
(2) 
First block 
(3) 
All rounds 
(4) 
     Pairwise correlation between i’s decision to report in round t 
{=1(0) if s/he reported (did not report)} and a dummy that 
indicates whether i’s round t partner was reported in round 
t – 1 {=1(0) if the partner was (was not) reported}  
.1285 .1740 .0968 .1068 
Two-sided p-value#1 < .001*** < .001*** .007*** < .001*** 
     
(B) C-Full and F-Full treatments 
 C-Full F-Full 
 First block 
(5) 
All rounds 
(6) 
First block 
(7) 
All rounds 
(8) 
     Pairwise correlation between i’s decision to report in round t 
{=1(0) if s/he reported (did not report)} and the quantity of i’s 
round t partner j’s reputation {the % of rounds in a given 
supergame where j was reported so far} 
.1206 .1259 .0857 .1357 
Two-sided p-value #1 .003*** < .001*** .012** < .001*** 
     
Notes: All observations (except the ones in the first round of supergames) were used. #1 The two-sided p-value in each 
column was calculated based on a subject random effects probit regression with robust bootstrapped standard errors (300 
replications) in which the dependent variable is i’s decision to report in round t. A dummy that indicates whether i received a 
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report for her round t partner’s last-round action was included as an independent variable in columns (1) to (4). The quantity 
of i’s round t partner j’s reputation was included as an independent variable in columns (5) to (8). Considering that reporting 
decisions were found to be affected by stage game outcome (see Results 4(a) and (b)), the cooperator-cooperator reporting 
dummy, the cooperator-defector reporting dummy and the defector-cooperator reporting dummy (the reference group was 
the defector-defector outcome) were included as controls. These three dummies indicate subjects’ stage game outcomes in 
the current round. Further, the previous supergame length was also controlled in the regression. It is worth noting that the 
correlations are significant at p < .001 for all columns if p-values are calculated based on the formula of the pairwise 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients instead of using regressions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 
level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
4.3. Reputational Information and Behaviors 
 On what mechanism did endogenous monitoring help sustain cooperation in 
communities? Studying this question is meaningful as a driving force behind Results 1 and 2. 
The availability of reputational information may serve as a coordination device, thereby enabling 
subjects to achieve mutual cooperation easily (Section 3). The method to explore the role of the 
reputational information is to perform a regression analysis in which the dependent variable is 
subjects’ decisions to cooperate. The estimation result reveals that irrespective of the treatment 
condition, subjects on average cooperated conditional upon the quality of their partners’ 
reputational information (Table 5). First, as shown in columns (1) to (4), subjects were 
significantly more (less) likely to select cooperation when matched with an unmasked cooperator 
(defector), compared with when matched with a masked individual, in the two Min treatments – 
see the coefficient estimates for variables (c) and (d). These columns also indicate that a 
cooperator in round t – 1 was significantly more likely than a defector to select cooperation again 
in round t, suggesting some consistency of their cooperation decisions across the rounds. A 
comparison between columns (1) and (3) (columns (2) and (4)) interestingly suggests that 
subjects responded to reputational information more strongly when reporting was costly rather 
than cost-free. This seems to contrast with Result 1. However, this discrepancy can be explained 
by the less frequent reporting in the C-Min than in the F-Min treatment. 
Second, columns (5) to (8), likewise show that the larger fraction of cooperation her 
current-round partner had in his observable reputational record, the more likely a subject was to 
select cooperation in the C-Full and F-Full treatments (see variable (g)). This tendency is 
especially strong in the F-Full treatment: subjects in the F-Full treatment decided action choices 
mainly based on the quality of the partners’ reputation. By contrast, subjects in the C-Full 
treatment weighed their own reputation quality similarly to their partners’, seeming to suggest 
that, with less accurate reputational information, subjects carefully contemplated how their 
partners would react to own reputation scores (see variable (e)). 
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In the Full treatments, the ‘quantity’ measure had only minor roles in the subjects’ 
decisions to cooperate. While subjects in these treatments were aware of how frequently their 
current-round partners were reported so far, they weighed the quantity information much less 
than the quality information in deciding on an action (see variable (h)).  
In sum, these analyses suggest that subjects on average used the reported information as a 
device to coordinate with peers by conditionally selecting cooperation based on its quality. 
 Result 5: (a) Subjects were significantly more (less) likely to select cooperation when matched 
with an unmasked cooperator (defector), compared with when matched with a masked 
individual, in the C-Min and F-Min treatments. (b) The larger fraction of cooperation her 
current-round partner had in his observable reputational record, the more likely a subject was to 
select cooperation in the C-Full and F-Full treatments.  
 
Table 5: Reputational Information and Action Choices 
Dependent variable: a dummy that equals 1 (0) if subject i chose to cooperate (defect) in round t. 
 C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full 
 1st block 
(1) 
All rounds 
(2) 
1st block 
(3) 
All rounds 
(4) 
1st block 
(5) 
All rounds 
(6) 
1st block 
(7) 
All rounds 
(8) 
         (a) Own choice in round t – 1 {=1(0) when 
subject i cooperated (defected)} 
1.077*** 
(.130) 
1.161*** 
(.103) 
.696*** 
(.123) 
.762*** 
(.118) --- --- --- --- 
(b) Variable (a) × reported dummy {= 1(0) 
if subject i’s round t – 1 action was reported} 
.182 
(.121) 
.156* 
(.91) 
.186** 
(.093) 
.188*** 
(.073) --- --- --- --- 
(c) Cooperated partner dummy {=1 when 
subject i’s round t partner cooperated in round 
t – 1 and it was reported; 0 otherwise}#1 
.623*** 
(.162) 
.654*** 
(.130) 
.536*** 
(.083) 
.529*** 
(.071) --- --- --- --- 
(d) Defected partner dummy {=1 when 
subject i’s round t partner defected in round 
t – 1 and it was reported; 0 otherwise}#1 
-.950*** 
(.185) 
-.902*** 
(.163) 
-.389*** 
(.089) 
-.447*** 
(.090) --- --- --- --- 
(e) Own reputation quality in round t {= 
the % of cases in a given supergame where 
subject i cooperated in prior rounds when s/he 
was reported} 
--- --- --- --- 1.168*** (.213) 
1.331*** 
(.217) 
.365 
(.233) 
.343 
(.293) 
(f) Variable (e) × Size of own reputation 
in round t {= the % of prior rounds in a 
given supergame where subject i was reported 
so far} 
--- --- --- --- .381 (.295) 
.018 
(.259) 
.336* 
(.180) 
.168 
(.205) 
(g) Round t partner j’s reputation quality 
{= the % of cases in a given supergame where 
j cooperate in prior rounds when s/he was 
reported} 
--- --- --- --- 1.048*** (.174) 
1.343*** 
(.181) 
1.410*** 
(.200) 
1.664*** 
(.221) 
(h) Variable (g) × Size of round t partner 
j’s reputation {= the % of prior rounds in a 
given supergame where j was reported so far} 
--- --- --- --- .342 (.244) 
.332 
(.225) 
.146 
(.166) 
.424** 
(.193) 
(i) First supergame dummy {= 1 for the first 
supergame; 0 otherwise} 
.562*** 
(.098) 
.401*** 
(.086) 
.226 
(.183) 
.145 
(.150) 
-.005 
(.158) 
.145 
(.185) 
.140 
(.089) 
.069 
(.079) 
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(j) Previous supergame length#2 .001 
(.002) 
.001 
(.002) 
.002 
(.007) 
-.000 
(.006) 
-.009 
(.005) 
-.006 
(.004) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.000 
(.001) 
Constant -1.086*** 
(.150) 
-1.160*** 
(.161) 
-.624*** 
(.200) 
-.679*** 
(.172) 
1.410*** 
(.184) 
-1.700*** 
(.180) 
-1.290*** 
(.165) 
-1.305*** 
(.164) 
         
# of Observations 3,456 9,696 3,456 6,952 2,206 4,738 3,382 9,574 
Wald chi-squared 135.73 187.63 93.64 125.22 115.15 138.05 103.16 145.99 
Prob > Wald chi-squared .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
         
Notes: Subject random effects probit regressions with robust bootstrapped standard errors (300 replications). All 
observations except the ones in round 1 [i.e., variables (a) to (d) can be defined] were used in columns (1) to (4). Only 
observations where both i and j were reported at least once [i.e., variables (e) and (g) can be defined] were used in columns 
(5) to (8). #1 The reference group in columns (1) to (4) is the case in which i was matched with a masked partner in round t. 
#2 Variable (j) is zero in the first supergame, while the first supergame dummy – variable (i) – was included to control for 
cooperation behaviors without any experience.  
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
4.4. Structural Estimation of Subjects’ Strategy Choices 
 It was found in Section 4.1 that subjects’ decisions to cooperate were severely affected by 
endogenous monitoring. But in more detail, how did subjects’ strategy choices change by the 
endogenous monitoring institutions? While subjects’ average cooperation behaviors were found 
to be characterized by conditional cooperative strategies (Result 5), one may wonder exactly 
what fraction of subjects acted according to such conditional cooperative strategies responding to 
their matched partners’ reputations.  
In order to answer these questions, subjects’ strategy choices regarding cooperation were 
estimated, supergame by supergame, by applying the maximum likelihood method developed by 
Dal Bó and Frechétte (2011) to this study.24 This method assumes a fixed number of strategies 
subjects can take and then assigns one strategy to each subject. The set of strategies assumed in 
Dal Bó and Frechétte (2011) are: AD (“Always Defect”), AC (“Always Cooperate”), GT (“Grim 
Trigger”), TFT (“Tit For Tat”), WSLS (“Win Stay Loose Shift”), and T2 (“Trigger Strategy with 2 
Periods of Punishment”).25,26 Each subject’s strategy choice was identified in the N treatment 
using the same set of strategies, considering that their interactions were anonymously made in this 
control setup (panel i of Fig. 4). The estimation result indicates that 72.6% of the subjects’ strategy 
choices were explained by only the two strategies – the AD and TFT strategies.27 Among the two, 
                                                 
24
 The estimation assigned pure strategies to most subjects in the present study. For simplicity, a subject was assigned 
a pure strategy with the highest probability in case that she was assigned a mixed strategy. 
25
 A GT subject selects defection in all future rounds as soon as she experiences defection.  
26 The GT, TFT, WSLS, and T2 subjects are assumed to select cooperation in the first round of a given supergame. 
27
 As discussed in footnote 13, this estimation result is similar to the one under partner matching in Dal Bó and 
Frechétte (2011). They found that the AD and TFT strategies together account for 80% of their subjects’ behaviors. 
This implies that in the absence of reputational information, subjects’ behavioral patterns may be similar between 
partner versus random matching. 
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a much larger fraction of subjects, somewhat below the majority of the population, acted 
according to the AD strategy, which reasonably explains why cooperation stayed low in the N 
treatment (Figs. 2 and 3). 
Subjects have reputational information in the four main treatments. As such, subjects’ 
strategy choices were estimated by including a new strategy where a subject acts according to her 
partner’s reputational information while removing the T2 strategy.28 The newly added strategy is 
called the Rep (“Reputation”) strategy, and can be defined differently by the information structure 
as follows: first, in the C-Min and F-Min treatments, a Rep subject is assumed to select 
cooperation in round t if her matched partner selected cooperation in round t–1 and it is 
observable; and to select defection otherwise. Second, in the C-Full and F-Full treatments, a Rep 
subject is assumed to select cooperation (defection) in round t if her matched partner j selected 
cooperation at least 50% (less than 50%) of the time in his observable reputational record.29 
The AD, AC and TFT strategies can be defined the same as in the N treatment. However, 
the GT strategy can be re-defined for the four main treatments since subjects can learn some other 
pairs’ interaction outcomes (e.g., Camera and Casari, 2009; Kamei, 2017). The revised strategy is 
called the SGT (“Strong GT”) strategy in the paper to distinguish it from the GT strategy of the N 
treatment. A SGT subject i is assumed to select cooperation if i did not experience defection in her 
stage game interactions so far or i did not see any instance of defection in her partners’ observable 
reputational records (i is assumed to select defection otherwise). As touched upon in Section 3, 
defection therefore spreads more quickly across the community under endogenous monitoring 
than in the N treatment if some people act according to the SGT strategy. 
Panels ii to v of Fig. 4 show the estimation result, revealing three interesting patterns. 
First, the percentages of subjects who acted according to the AD strategy are substantially smaller 
under endogenous monitoring than in the N treatment. The percentages are especially smaller 
when reporting does not involve a cost: they are 36.7% and 51.0% smaller in the F-Min and F-
Full treatments, respectively, than in the N treatment (the difference is each significant – see 
Appendix Table B.4). The corresponding percentages under costly reporting are somewhere in the 
                                                 
28
 Subjects’ strategy choices were estimating assuming the same set of strategies used in the Dal Bó and Frechétte 
(2011) for the four main treatments as a preliminary analysis. As summarized in panels ii to v of Appendix Fig. B.3, 
and in Appendix Table B.3, the T2 strategy was almost never selected by subjects in each main treatment.  
29
 This definition is set for the sake of simplicity. The Rep strategy could alternatively be defined, for example, 
using a stochastic action choice, as a subject can observe her partner’s cooperation rate and the quantity of reported 
information so far from his reputation record. Using such a strategy makes the estimation complicated, however.  
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middle between the N and free-reporting setups, which again resonates with the idea that subjects’ 
decisions may be discontinuous between zero and positive costs (e.g., Kamei, 2017, 2020).  
Second, endogenous monitoring encouraged subjects to act according to the most 
generous strategy – the AC strategy – in the Min condition. Subjects’ likelihoods to act according 
to this strategy in C-Min and F-Min treatments are significantly higher at the 10% and 1% levels, 
respectively, compared with the N treatment (Table B.4). Especially, the AC strategy is the more 
prevalent strategy than any other strategy in the F-Min treatment (Fig. 4). 
Third, by contrast, the percentages of the AC subjects in the Full condition are not 
significantly different from that in the N treatment (Table B.4). However, the percentages of the 
TFT subjects are significantly smaller in the C-Full and F-Full treatments than in the N treatment 
at the 1% level (Fig. 4, Appendix Table B.4). Instead, remarkably, 31.3% and 47.3% of subjects 
were estimated to have acted based on the Rep strategy in the C-Full and F-Full treatments, 
respectively. It should be noted that subjects in the Min condition could have also decided on an 
action based on their partners’ reputations (last-round action choices). However, only 10.9% and 
14.7% of subjects in the C-Min and F-Min treatments, respectively, acted according to the Rep 
strategy (Fig. 4).30 So, why did subjects’ strategy choices drastically differ between the Min and 
Full conditions? It may be due to the availability of a reputational platform: since all reported 
action choices get stored in the platform in the C-Full and F-Full treatments (Result 3), subjects 
in the Full condition may have tended to rely on the reputational information in choosing an 
action, instead of, say, relying on their own experiences and using the tit for tat. 
Subjects’ decisions to report may differ according to their strategy choices just discussed. 
In order to study this possibility, subjects’ average reporting rates were calculated by the 
estimated strategy choice, supergame by supergame (Appendix Table B.5). The results are messy 
due to the large volatility of reporting behaviors stemming from the small sample size. These 
calculations, however, indicate that reporting rates are much higher for the AC, Rep and TFT 
subjects than for the AD subjects. This pattern reinforces Result 4(a). 
 Result 6: (a) 72.6% of subjects’ strategy choices were explained by the AD and TFT strategies in 
the N treatment. (b) The percentages of the AD subjects were much lower with endogenous 
monitoring, especially in the F-Min and F-Full treatments, that in the N treatment. (c) Subjects 
                                                 
30
 The percentages of the Rep subjects are significantly different between the C-Min (F-Min) and C-Full (F-Full) 
treatments at two-sided p < .001 (Table B.4). 
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were significantly more likely to act according to the AC strategy in the C-Min and F-Min 
treatments than in the N treatment. By contrast, (d) in the C-Full and F-Full treatments, a large 
percentage of subjects acted according to the Rep strategy. The percentages of the Rep subjects 
are significantly larger compared with the corresponding Min treatments. 
 
 Fig. 4: Strategy Choices Regarding Cooperation, Supergame by Supergame 
 
Note: The percentage written in each region indicates the average percentage in which a given strategy was used by 
subjects across the six supergames. The detail of the estimation result can be found in Appendix Table B.4.  
 
The last question that remains unanswered is exactly what motivated subjects to engage 
in reporting. While we uncovered differences in reporting by stage game outcome and also the 
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evidence of conditional reporting (Results 3 and 4), subjects’ reporting may be motivated by 
heterogeneous reasons. As a final analysis, a structural estimation of subjects’ reporting strategy 
choices was performed again utilizing the maximum likelihood method. 
Six reporting strategies were assumed in this exercise. The first strategy is called the 
“Always Not Report” strategy, shortened as AN. A subject in this category never engages in 
reporting. The second strategy, called “Always Report” (shortened as AR), is defined literally as 
the one where a subject always engages in reporting. These two strategies are similar to the AD 
and AC strategies in the context of prisoner’s dilemma interactions. Considering that subjects’ 
reporting was on average conditional upon others’ reporting (Table 4), the “Conditional 
Reporting” strategy (shortened as CR) is included as the third strategy. The CR subjects 
reciprocate others’ reporting in the past. The specific definition is as follows: a CR subject i is 
assumed to report her partner in round t if i received a report in that round in the Min condition; 
and is assumed to report her partner if the matched partner was reported at least 50% so far in the 
Full condition. It is also assumed that the CR subject report in the first round of a supergame.  
Three more strategies were further included to capture the possibility that their reporting 
was driven by other-regarding preferences or emotions. First, the IA (shortened from “Inequity 
Aversion”) strategy is defined as one where subject i reports her partner only when i cooperated 
but her partner defected in the current interaction (i does not report her partner for the other three 
prisoner’s dilemma outcomes). Notice that an inequity averse cooperator incurs a utility loss 
when exploited by a defector due to feeling of disadvantage (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). 
Second, a RR (shortened from “Reciprocal Reporting”) type i reports her partner when i 
cooperated, but not when i defected. This reporting is driven by reciprocity in the prisoner’s 
dilemma interaction (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). It is assumed that a 
reciprocal cooperator engages in reporting when matched with a cooperator (defector) from 
positive (negative) reciprocity. Third, the PD (shortened from “Punishing Defecting Partner”) 
strategy is defined as one where i always reports when matched with a defector due to negative 
emotions. 
Fig. 5 reports the estimation results. Three clear patterns emerged. First, the AN strategy 
is by far the most popular strategy when reporting is costly. The percentages of the AN subjects 
are huge – 55.5% and 44.6% in the C-Min and C-Full treatments, respectively. By sharp contrast, 
almost all subjects were estimated to have engaged in (some) reporting when reporting does not 
involve a cost. The percentage of the AN subjects is only 12.9% (9.7%) in the F-Min (F-Full) 
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treatment, which is significantly smaller than that in the C-Min (C-Full) treatment (see Appendix 
Table B.6). The difference in the reporting strategy choice between free versus costly reporting 
again suggests a strong discontinuity in people’s decisions between zero and positive costs. 
Second, remarkably, more than the majority of subjects acted according to the AR 
strategy when reporting did not involve a cost. This may mean that most subjects appreciated the 
beneficial effects of reputational information on cooperation. Interestingly, however, this result is 
in clear contrast with the costly reporting settings: unconditional reporting accounted for only 
5.9% and 12.4% of the subjects’ reporting strategies in the C-Min and C-Full treatments, 
respectively. This may mean that some non-material motives and/or emotions are required to 
overcome the hurdle of positive reporting costs. Third, consistent with this conjecture, a 
significantly larger fraction of subjects acted according to the IA strategy under costly than free 
reporting (Fig. 5, Appendix Table B.6). This suggests that perhaps, cooperators who are averse to 
disadvantageous inequality were motivated to warn others, in order to prevent the defecting 
partners from earning high by exploiting the peers. 
Fig. 5: Reporting Strategy Choices, Supergame by Supergame 
  
 
Note: The percentage written in each region indicates the average percentage in which a given strategy was used by 
subjects across the six supergames. The detail of the estimation result can be found in Appendix Table B.6. 
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 Result 7: (a) The AN strategy was by far the most prevalent strategy when reporting was costly. 
By contrast, (b) this strategy was rarely selected when reporting did not involve a cost. Instead, 
around 65% of subjects acted according to the AR strategy in the F-Min and F-Full treatments. 
(c) Costly reporting was partly driven by cooperators’ behindness aversion.  
 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper experimentally investigated how endogenous monitoring through gossiping 
can improve cooperation with strangers in an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. The 
results first indicated that its effectiveness is severely affected by the reporting cost. On the one 
hand, when reporting did not involve a cost, subjects reported their partners’ action choices more 
than 70% of the time on average and then achieved strong cooperation norms. Remarkably, the 
strong impact of endogenous monitoring did not depend on the availability of a platform 
whereby all future partners can check the previously reported information.  
On the other hand, subjects only occasionally engaged in reporting when it was costly. As 
a result, costly reporting had almost no effects in boosting cooperation when the reported 
information was transmitted only to their next-round partners. By clear contrast, intriguingly, 
costly reporting had a positive effect when the publicly available platform that stores reputational 
information was present. The strong interaction effect between gossiping and the reputational 
platform can explain why reputation mechanisms in real online markets, such as eBay and Uber, 
are functioning effectively despite possible selection bias of reported information and unwanted 
side effects embedded in the mechanism (e.g., Dellarocas, 2003). 
A regression analysis suggests that under endogenous monitoring, subjects on average 
cooperated conditionally upon the quality of their partners’ reputational information, meaning 
that reputational information can effectively serve as a coordination device among strangers. 
Nevertheless, the percentage of the subjects who act according to such conditional strategy did 
differ according to the information structure. According to a structural estimation of subjects’ 
strategy choices, only less than 15% of the subjects acted according to the Reputation strategy 
when reported information was not stored. By sharp contrast, with the reputational platform, 
remarkably, 31.3% (47.3%) of subjects were estimated to have acted based on such Reputation 
strategy when reporting was costly (cost-free). Hence, the availability of a publicly available 
reputation platform plays a vital role in inducing players to utilize the reputational information. 
Nevertheless, the analysis revealed strong heterogeneity in the subjects’ strategy choices, 
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suggesting that care should be exercised when analyzing subjects’ cooperation behaviors under 
endogenous monitoring using theoretical models, simulations, etc.   
Although the experimental findings are clear, there are many exciting directions for 
further research. For instance, it would definitely be meaningful to explore how the results 
obtained in the experiment are robust to the parameters of the experiment, such as the payoff 
matrix, the continuation probability, the group size, the size of the reporting cost, and the 
contents/formats of reporting. For example, the continuation probability was set at 95% in this 
study. The impact of endogenous monitoring may depend on the probability, considering the 
prior experiment research that suggests that subjects’ decisions to cooperate may be strongly 
affected by the degree of subjects’ patience (Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2018). Likewise, the 
functioning of endogenous monitoring may depend on the group size because the theoretical 
literature in repeated games discuss the effects of group size under random matching (Kandori, 
1992). Alternatively, both the way in which players gossip, and how they respond to reputational 
information, may differ according to the flexibility of pairing and the contents of information. 
The standard random matching protocol was used in the experiment. In addition, the subjects 
were only able to truthfully report their opponents’ action choices. These are good 
simplifications, because (a) the theoretical frameworks were well developed for the setup with 
random matching (e.g., Kandori, 1992; Ellison, 1994; Camera and Casari, 2009) and (b) the 
recent research suggests that most gossiping conveys truthful information even when lying is 
possible (Fonseca and Peters, 2018). Nevertheless, users in real online platforms can choose with 
whom they deal based on rating scores as well as (subjective) feedback comments. Such partner 
choice and detailed communication contents may further boost the effectiveness of endogenous 
monitoring, as was shown in the context of auctions (Brosig-Koch and Heinrich, 2018). It is 
undoubtedly worthwhile to explore the role of endogenous monitoring in more depth. 
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Appendix A: Theoretical Analysis 
 
A.1. Transition Matrix and Standard Equilibrium Analysis 
     
This section discusses threshold δ (δ*, hereafter) above which selecting the grim trigger 
strategy (cooperative strategy) is a Nash equilibrium, assuming that the strategy space is 
restricted to only the grim trigger strategy and the always defect strategy. Note that it is also a 
NE for all players to act according to the always defect strategy for any δ. 
     
The first step to find δ* is to construct a Markov transition matrix that describes how 
defection spreads across a group, assuming that all members (other than a specific member i who 
deviates from the grim trigger strategy in a given round) act according to the grim trigger 
strategy. The value function of the player i can next be defined dependent on the matrix and the 
number of defectors in that round. Denote the value function when the number of defectors is d 
as Vd. δ* can be derived by using the condition that the expected lifetime payoff of i is lower 
when deviating from than following the grim trigger strategy even when she is the first player to 
deviate from the trigger strategy in her group. The detail for this equilibrium-path case is 
summarized in Section A.1.1.  
 
Nevertheless, once players are allowed to select any strategy, acting according to the grim trigger 
strategy is no longer an equilibrium, because players have certain incentives to refrain from 
punishing defectors in order to prevent defection from spreading in the group. This can be 
demonstrated by using an off-equilibrium case in which there is a member that chooses 
cooperation one time after observing a defection (Section A.1.2).  
      
A.1.1. Threshold δ above which everyone acts according to the grim trigger strategy 
      
Assume that everyone act according to the grim trigger strategy but one player decides to 
defect without observing defection. Consider this player who selects defection (player i, 
hereafter). pd is used to express the probability for i to interact with a cooperator when the 
number of defectors is d. As the random matching protocol is used, the probability vector for i’s 
interacting with a cooperator can be found as follows: 
 
p = (p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8) = (1, 6/7, 5/7, 4/7, 3/7, 2/7, 1/7, 0). 
 
The Markov transition matrix (denoted as M) can be derived as follows: 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1/7 0 6/7 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 3/7 0 4/7 0 0 
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4 0 0 0                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         3/35 0 24/35 0 8/35
5 0 0 0 0 0 3/7 0 4/7 
6 0 0 0 0 0 1/7 0 6/7 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Following the notations used in Camera and Casari (2009), the bold numbers in rows and in 
columns indicate the numbers of defectors in round t (current round) and in round t + 1 (next 
round), respectively. Derivations of some entries in M are worth explaining: 
   
Pr[4|3] = 3/7. Consider any defector in round t (denoted as defector 1). The number of defectors 
will be four in round t + 1 if defector 1 is matched with another defector in round t, as the 
remaining defector should then be matched with a cooperator. This happens with a probability of 
2/7. The number of defectors will also be four in round t + 1 if defector 1 is paired with a 
cooperator and the remaining two defectors are paired with each other. This happens with a 
probability of 1/7 (= 5/7×1/5). In other words, Pr[4|3] = 2/7+1/7 = 3/7.  
 
Pr[6|3] = 4/7. The number of defectors will be six in round t + 1 when all three defectors are 
paired with cooperators in round t. The probability is: 5/7×4/5 = 4/7. 
 
Pr[4|4] = 3/35. The number of defectors will remain unchanged if each defector is matched with 
a defector. This happens with a probability of 3/7×1/5 = 3/35.  
 
Pr[6|4] = 24/35. Consider any defector (defector 1) in round t as in previous explanations. The 
number of defectors in round t + 1 will be six for the following two cases: 
 Defector 1 is matched with another defector, while the two remaining defectors are 
matched with cooperators. This happens with a probability of 3/7×4/5 = 12/35. 
 Defector 1 is matched with a cooperator, another defector is also matched with a 
cooperator, and the remaining two defectors are matched with each other. This happens 
with a probability of 4/7×(2/5+3/5×1/3) = 12/35. 
Pr[8|4] = 8/35. This transition happens when all defectors are matched with cooperators. This 
situation happens with a probability of 4/7×3/5×2/3 = 8/35. 
Pr[6|5] = 3/7. The number of defectors will increase by one if one cooperator is paired with a 
cooperator in round t. This happens with a probability of 2/7+5/7×1/5 = 3/7. 
Pr[8|5] = 4/7. Each cooperator must be matched with a defector. This happens with a probability 
of 5/7×4/5 = 4/7.  
 
The value function for player i can be expressed using the Markov transition matrix: 
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𝑉𝑑 = 𝑧 + 𝑝𝑑(ℎ − 𝑧) + 𝛿𝑀𝑑𝑉, 
where 𝑀𝑑 is the dth row of M, h = 30 (defector’s payoff when interacting with a cooperator), and 
z = 10 (mutual defection payoff). 
 
Using the transition matrix M, 𝑉𝑑 for each d can be expressed as follows: 
 
o 𝑉1 = ℎ + 𝛿𝑉2. 
o 𝑉2 = 𝑧 + 67 (ℎ − 𝑧) + 𝛿 (17 𝑉2 + 67 𝑉4). 
o 𝑉3 = 𝑧 + 57 (ℎ − 𝑧) + 𝛿 (37 𝑉4 + 47 𝑉6). 
o 𝑉4 = 𝑧 + 47 (ℎ − 𝑧) + 𝛿 ( 335 𝑉4 + 2435 𝑉6 + 835 𝑉8). 
o 𝑉5 = 𝑧 + 37 (ℎ − 𝑧) + 𝛿 (37 𝑉6 + 47 𝑉8). 
o 𝑉6 = 𝑧 + 27 (ℎ − 𝑧) + 𝛿 (17 𝑉6 + 67 𝑉8). 
o 𝑉7 = 𝑧 + 17 (ℎ − 𝑧) + 𝛿𝑉8. 
o 𝑉8 = 𝑧1−𝛿. 
 
The expected lifetime payoff of player i can be expressed in terms of h, z and  using the above 
value functions recursively: 
 𝑉7 = 𝑧 + 17 (ℎ − 𝑧) + 𝛿𝑧1−𝛿. 
 𝑉6 = 𝑧(5+𝛿) +2ℎ(1− 𝛿)(𝛿−1)(𝛿−7) .  
 𝑉5 = 𝑧(3𝛿2+11𝛿+28)+3ℎ(1−𝛿)(7+𝛿)7(𝛿−1)(𝛿−7) . 
 𝑉4 = 𝑧(−31𝛿2−56𝛿−105)−28ℎ(1−𝛿)(5+𝛿)(3𝛿−35)(𝛿−1)(𝛿−7) . 
 𝑉3 = 𝑧(−75𝛿3−366𝛿2−413𝛿−490)+ℎ(75𝛿3+345𝛿2+805𝛿−1,225)(3𝛿−35)(7𝛿−7)(𝛿−7) . 
 𝑉2 = 𝑧(183𝛿3+395𝛿2+329𝛿+245)+ℎ(−186𝛿3−318𝛿2−966𝛿+1,470)(3𝛿−35)(𝛿−1)(𝛿−7)2 . 
  𝑉1 = ℎ +  𝑧𝛿(183𝛿3+395𝛿2+329𝛿+245)+ℎ𝛿(−186𝛿3−318𝛿2−966𝛿+1,470)(3𝛿−35)(𝛿−1)(𝛿−7)2 .  
 
Deviating from the grim trigger strategy is not optimal if 𝑦1−𝛿 > 𝑉1. Here, y = 25 (stage 
game payoff from mutual cooperation). The condition 𝑦1−𝛿 > 𝑉1 reduces to: 𝛿 > 𝛿̅ ≈ .574. 
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A.1.2. Incentives to not exercise punishment even if a player observed defection. 
 
Assume that everyone acts according to the grim trigger strategy, but one player who was 
betrayed still chooses cooperation in the next round (she reverts to the sanctioning strategy after 
the next). This is Case 2 of the theoretical analysis in the appendix of Camera and Casari (2009). 
Assume that only one player deviates from the grim trigger strategy in order to check the 
viability of the strategy. The motive behind this player’s deviation can be interpreted as her 
attempt to prevent defection from quickly spreading to other members. The following shows that 
players have incentives to deviate from punishment under certain conditions, meaning that acting 
according to the grim trigger strategy does not constitute an equilibrium. 
  
The term “player 1” is used to refer to the player who decided to deviate from the 
sanctioning rule by choosing cooperation one more time before reverting defection in the next 
round. The following considers player 1 and redoes the analysis as was done for Case 1 above.  
     
In this case, the Markov transition matrix, denoted as ?̃?, is different from M because of 
the presence of player 1. When the number of defectors (d) is more than one, d–1 defectors 
sanction according to the grim trigger strategy in this round. ?̃? can be thus derived as follows: 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1/7 6/7 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 1/7 2/7 4/7 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 3/35 12/35 12/35 8/35 0 
5 0 0 0 0 3/35 12/35 12/35 8/35 
6 0 0 0 0 0 1/7 2/7 4/7 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/7 6/7 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
The bold numbers in rows (columns) indicate the numbers of players who are currently choosing 
to defect, or choosing to deviate from the trigger strategy despite her latest interaction with a 
defector, in round t (in round t + 1).  
Rows 1 and 8:  
Pr[2|1] = 1 and Pr[8|8] = 1 by applying the same logic used in Camera and Casari (2009) 
to the setup in which group size is eight. 
Row 7 (player 1, one cooperator and six defectors in round t):  
The number of defectors will remain seven in round t + 1 if player 1 is paired with a 
cooperator in round t. Thus, Pr[7|7] = 1/7. 
Row 6 (player 1, two cooperators and five defectors in round t):  
 There are three cases as summarized below: 
6 
 
(A) The number of defectors will remain six in round t + 1 if a cooperator i is matched with 
another cooperator in round t. Hence, Pr[6|6] = 1/7. 
(B) The number of defectors will be seven in round t + 1 if player 1 is paired with one of the two 
cooperators in round t (the remaining cooperator must then interact with a defector in that round). 
Hence, Pr[7|6] = 2/7.  
(C) Lastly, the number of defectors in round t + 1 will be eight if each cooperator interacts with 
a defector in round t. Thus, Pr[8|6] = 5/7×4/5 = 4/7. 
Row 5 (player 1, three cooperators and four defectors in round t): 
There are four cases as summarized below: 
(A) The number of defectors will be five in round t + 1 if player 1 interacts with a cooperator 
and two cooperators are paired together in round t. In other words, Pr[5|5] = 3/7×1/5 = 3/35. 
(B) The number of defectors will be six in round t + 1 under the following two situations:  
(a) A cooperator i is paired with a cooperator in round t, while the remaining cooperator is 
paired with a defector in that round. This happens with a probability of 2/7×4/5 = 8/35.  
(b) The cooperator i is paired with a defector in round t. The remaining two cooperators are 
paired together. This happens with a probability of 4/7×1/5 = 4/35. 
 In short, Pr[6|5] = 8/35 + 4/35 = 12/35. 
(C) The number of defectors will be seven in round t + 1 if player 1 is paired with a cooperator 
while the remaining two cooperators are each paired with a defector in round t. In other words, 
Pr[7|5] = 3/7×4/5 = 12/35.  
(D) The number of defectors will be eight in round t + 1 if three cooperators are all paired with 
defectors in round t. In other words, Pr[8|5] = 4/7×3/5×2/3 = 8/35. 
Row 4 (player 1, four cooperators and three defectors in round t): 
There are four cases as follows: 
(A) The number of defectors will remain four in round t + 1 if player 1 is paired with a 
defector, while each cooperator is paired with a cooperator in round t. In other words, Pr[4|4] = 
3/7×3/5×1/3 = 3/35.  
(B) The number of defectors will be five in round t + 1 in the following two situations:  
(a) Player 1 is paired with a cooperator in round t. Another cooperator i is paired with a 
cooperator while the remaining cooperator is paired with a defector in that round. This 
happens with a probability of 4/7×2/5 = 8/35. 
(b) Player 1 is paired with a cooperator in round t. The cooperator i is paired with a defector 
while the remaining cooperator is paired with a cooperator in that round. This happens with 
a probability of 4/7×3/5×1/3 = 4/35. 
In short, Pr[5|4] = 8/35 + 4/35 = 12/35.  
(C) The number of defectors will be six in round t + 1 if player 1 is paired with a defector and 
the remaining two defectors are each paired with a cooperator in round t. In other words, 
Pr[6|4] = 3/7×4/5 = 12/35. 
(D) The number of defectors will be seven in round t + 1 if player 1 is matched with a 
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cooperator, while the remaining cooperators are all paired with defectors in round t. Thus, 
Pr[7|4] = 4/7×3/5×2/3 = 8/35. 
Row 3 (player 1, five cooperators and two defectors in round t): 
A logic similar to the ones already discussed applies to Pr[3|3] = 1/7 (the number of defectors 
will be three in round t +1 if the two defectors are paired together in round t), Pr[4|3] = 2/7 (the 
number of defectors will be four in round t + 1 if player 1 is paired with a defector in round t) 
and Pr[5|3] = 5/7×4/5 = 4/7 (the number of defectors will be five in round t + 1 if the two 
defectors are each paired with a cooperator in round t).  
Row 2 (player 1, six cooperators and one defector in round t): 
Likewise, Pr[2|2] = 1/7 (the number of defectors will be two in round t + 1 if player 1 is paired 
with a defector in round t); otherwise, P[3|2] = 6/7. 
 
The value function for player 1, denoted as ?̃?𝑑 in this appendix, depends on d (the number 
of deviators). The expected lifetime payoff of player 1 can be expressed as follows: ?̃?𝑑  = { 𝑉1                𝑖𝑓 𝑑 = 1.𝑙 + 𝑝𝑑(𝑦 − 𝑙) + 𝛿?̃?𝑉  𝑖𝑓 𝑑 ≥ 2. 
Here, l = 5 (sucker payoff) and y = 25 (mutual cooperation payoff). When d ≥ 2, d – 1 players 
follow the grim trigger strategy, while the remaining one player who has observed defection 
chooses cooperation, in this round. Here, the third term is 𝛿?̃?𝑉, not 𝛿?̃??̃?, because player 1 
reverts to the sanctioning strategy (defection) in the next round.  
 
Using ?̃?, the value function ?̃?𝑑 can be expressed as follows: 
 
o ?̃?8 = 𝑙 + 𝛿𝑉8. 
o ?̃?7 = 𝑙 + 17 (𝑦 −  𝑙) + 𝛿 (17 𝑉7 + 67 𝑉8). 
o ?̃?6 = 𝑙 + 27 (𝑦 −  𝑙) + 𝛿 (17 𝑉6 + 27 𝑉7 + 47 𝑉8) . 
o ?̃?5 = 𝑙 + 1535 (𝑦 −  𝑙) + 𝛿 ( 335 𝑉5 + 1235 𝑉6 + 1235 𝑉7 + 835 𝑉8). 
o ?̃?4 = 𝑙 + 2035 (𝑦 −  𝑙) + 𝛿 ( 335 𝑉4 + 1235 𝑉5 + 1235 𝑉6 + 835 𝑉7). 
o ?̃?3 = 𝑙 + 57 (𝑦 −  𝑙) + 𝛿 (17 𝑉3 + 27 𝑉4 + 47 𝑉5). 
o ?̃?2 = 𝑙 + 67 (𝑦 −  𝑙) + 𝛿 (17 𝑉2 + 67 𝑉3). 
 
The remaining task is to check whether selecting cooperating after observing a defection can be 
optimal.  
      
(i) ?̃?8 ≤ 𝑉8:  
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This is straightforward since l < z. Thus, selecting cooperation after observing a defection 
is not optimal when d = 8. 
 
(ii) ?̃?7 ≤ 𝑉7: 
The condition ?̃?7 ≤ 𝑉7 reduces to the following condition: 𝛿 ≤ −49𝑦  +294𝑧 +49ℎ−294𝑙ℎ−𝑧 = 3434 ,  
which always holds since 𝛿 used in the experiment is less than 1. This suggests that selecting 
cooperation after observing a defection is not optimal when d = 7. 
 
(iii) ?̃?6 ≤ 𝑉6: 
The condition ?̃?6 ≤ 𝑉6 reduces to the following condition: δ ≤ 14ℎ − 35𝑙 − 14𝑦 + 35𝑧2(ℎ−𝑧) = 498 , 
which always holds since 𝛿 used in the experiment is less than 1. This suggests that selecting 
cooperation after observing a defection is not optimal when d = 6. 
 
(iv) ?̃?5 ≤ 𝑉5: 
The condition ?̃?5 ≤ 𝑉5 reduces to the following condition: 
 δ ≤ 66524 − 7√7,34524 ≈ 2.712, 
which always holds since 𝛿 used in the experiment is less than 1. This suggests that selecting 
cooperation after observing a defection is not optimal when d = 5. 
 
(v) ?̃?4 ≤ 𝑉4: 
The condition ?̃?4 ≤ 𝑉4 reduces to the following condition: δ ≤ − 11532 + √28,90532 ≈ 1.719, 
which always holds since 𝛿 used in the experiment is less than 1. Thus, selecting 
cooperation after observing a defection is not optimal when d = 4. 
 
(vi) ?̃?3 ≤ 𝑉3: 
The condition ?̃?3 ≤ 𝑉3 reduces to the following condition: δ ≤ 7(17,511,949+6,084√8,165,949)13468 + 8,82736(17,511,949+6,084√8,165,949)13 − 16136 ≈ 1.166, 
which always holds since 𝛿 used in the experiment is less than 1. Thus, selecting 
cooperation after observing a defection is not optimal when d = 3. 
 
(vii) ?̃?2 ≤ 𝑉2: 
The condition ?̃?2 ≤ 𝑉2 reduces to the following condition: δ ≤ 7(80,703,351+600√18,321,963,933)131800 − 101,731600(80,703,351+600√18,321,963,933)13 − 581600 ≈ 0.840. 
This suggests that selecting cooperation after observing a defection is optimal, provided that 
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the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) her partner is the only defector in the group; 
and (2) the game will continue with a probability of 84% or higher. These conditions hold 
since  = 0.95 in the experiment. As discussed, the player’s decision to deviate from the 
punishment mode delays the breakdown of cooperation in the group. 
 
A.2. Simulations in the Presence of Conditional Cooperators 
This section reports simulation results regarding player’s optimal strategy choices, 
assuming that they choose one of the two strategies: (a) the Always Defect strategy (AD, 
hereafter), and (b) Conditional Cooperative strategy (CC, hereafter). The two strategies are 
defined in the context of each treatment as discussed in each subsection below. The probability 
distribution for the average lifetime payoffs of a specific player i was estimated given seven 
other group members’ strategy choices. The distribution was derived when i acts according to the 
AD strategy, and also when she acts according to the CC strategy, respectively. A comparison of 
the distributions between the two strategies is suggestive for the degree of stability of the 
cooperative equilibrium in a given treatment. 
A simulation involves a large volume of calculations. In order to reduce computer loads, 
a distribution of the average lifetime payoffs was estimated based on 50 iterations. One 
observation (average payoff when i selects the CC or AD strategy) was calculated by repeating 
the following calculation 500 times and then taking the average of 500 simulated total payoffs: 
1. Random matching: the computer randomly forms pairs in the group of eight in every round. 
2. The group has 100 rounds of interactions. Note that payoffs after round 100 are negligible 
due to discounting: 0.95100-1 = 0.0062 < 0.01. 
3. The strategies of all the seven other members in i’s group are given. A member that uses the 
AD strategy (AD player, hereafter) selects D in every round. A member that uses the CC 
strategy (CC player, hereafter) selects C with a probability of 80% in round 1, and selects C 
stochastically in any other round conditional on other members cooperating.1 The specific 
rule that the CC player follows after round 1 is defined in each subsection.  
4. The simulated lifetime payoff of player i is calculated by: ∑ 𝛿𝑡−1100𝑡=1 𝜋𝑖,𝑡, where 𝛿 = 0.95 
and 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 is the payoff of player i in round t. 
In other words, 100×500 rounds per average payoff × 4 pairs per group × 50 iterations = 
10,000,000 rounds of pair interactions were simulated to obtain one probability distribution of 
her average total payoffs when i selects a specific strategy. This simulation was performed for 
each treatment (see Sections A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.2.3). All simulations were programmed and 
implemented using Python. 
 
                                                 
1
 Additional simulations were also performed by alternatively assuming that the CC players select C randomly (i.e., 
with a probability of 50%) in round 1 when no reputational information is available. The simulation results were 
omitted because the predicted treatment differences are qualitatively similar to the case presented in Appendix A.2. 
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A.2.1. N treatment 
As subjects do not have any reputational information in the N treatment, the CC strategy 
can be defined based on their own interaction experiences as follows: 
     
Assumption 1: A CC player selects cooperation stochastically with a probability that her 
matched partners selected cooperation so far in a given supergame. 
     
By contrast, an AD player is defined as the one who always selects defection unconditionally. 
 
Each panel in Fig. A.1 compares the distributions of a player i’s average lifetime payoffs 
when she acts according to the AD strategy and when she acts according to the CC strategy, 
given the seven other members’ strategy choices. Panel a first shows that i’s optimal strategy 
choice is CC when all seven others do the same. Any other CC player has also no material 
incentives to switch to the AD strategy, meaning that a cooperative equilibrium exists. 
Nevertheless, this equilibrium is volatile. Panels b to h suggest that (i) i’s incentive to select the 
CC strategy quickly declines as the number of AD players increases, and that (ii) the symmetric 
cooperation situation collapses when more than one player deviates from the CC strategy. As 
shown in panels c to h, any CC player has a profitable deviation when more than one player 
deviates.  
 
Fig. A.1. Average Lifetime Payoffs Obtained by Player i, Conditional on the Seven Other 
Members’ Strategy Choices in the N treatment 
 
The two distributions in each panel below are significantly different according to a two-sided 
Mann-Whitney test (p < .00001), except for panel c. p (two-sided) = .059 for panel c. These test 
results suggest that i does not have material incentives to act according to the CC strategy unless 
the number of the AD players is less than or equal to one.  
  
 
   (a) When all the seven other members use the CC strategy (b) When six use the CC strategy and one uses the AD  strategy out of the seven other members 
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(c) When five use the CC strategy and two use the AD 
strategy out of the seven other members 
(d) When four use the CC strategy and three use the AD 
strategy out of the seven other members 
(e) When three use the CC strategy and four use the AD 
strategy out of the seven other members 
(f) When two use the CC strategy and five use the AD 
strategy out of the seven other members 
(g) When one uses the CC strategy and six use the AD 
strategy out of the seven other members 
(h) When all the seven other members use the AD strategy  
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A.2.2. C-Min and F-Min treatments 
In round t, subjects in the C-Min and F-Min treatments are aware of their matched 
partners’ round t – 1 action choices if the partners were reported in round t – 1. The simplest 
strategy that conditional cooperators can take is to condition their decision solely on their 
partners’ last-round decisions. This strategy can be defined as follows: 
     
Assumption 2: (a) CC players always engage in reporting regardless of the reporting cost.2 (b) 
A CC player selects cooperation (defection) when her current-round partner’s last-round action 
choice is cooperation (defection) and it is observable. When the partner has no history 
information, the CC player selects cooperation stochastically with a probability that her 
previous masked partners selected cooperation so far in a given supergame (as defined in 
Assumption 1 in the context of the N treatment). 
     
In other words, the reputational information can serve as a coordination device among CC 
players. Notice that the CC players’ conditionality towards unmasked partners can be interpreted 
as being similar to the tit for tat strategy if the CC players are assumed to believe that their 
partners would select the same actions as in the previous round.  
      
AD players select defection unconditionally. An assumption is, however, required for 
their reporting behaviors and can be set as follows, considering that AD players can free ride on 
peers’ reporting acts if they are selfishly motivated and want to avoid paying for reporting: 
     
Assumption 2: (c) An AD player does not report her partner’s action choice in the C-Min 
treatment, but she reports it always in the F-Min treatment.3  
         
Figs. A.2 and A.3 summarize simulation results for the F-Min and C-Min treatments, 
respectively. Panel a of each figure first shows that i’s optimal strategy choice is CC when all 
seven others do the same. Notice that any other CC player has also no profitable deviation to 
switching to the AD strategy, whose pattern is the same as in the N treatment. This implies that a 
cooperative equilibrium exists, irrespective of whether reporting is free or costly. Panels b to h of 
the two figures, however, reveal different patterns from the N treatment. Specifically, while i’s 
incentive to select the CC strategy relative to the AD strategy declines as the number of AD 
players increases in her group, the symmetric cooperation situation is stable such that a CC 
player has no profitable deviation to the AD strategy unless the number of the AD players is 
more than or equal to six (four) in the F-Min (C-Min) treatment. This supports the idea that 
endogenous monitoring can help sustain cooperation, aided by the reputational information. 
 
                                                 
2
 This is a simplified assumption. However, a positive reporting cost may significantly keep CC players from 
reporting and behaving cooperatively if they overreact to the positive cost (e.g., Kamei, 2017, 2020). 
3
 As reputational information improves cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games with random 
matching (Camera and Casari 2009; Kamei, 2017), one can assume that AD players report if reporting is cost-free. 
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Fig. A.2. Average Lifetime Payoffs Obtained by Player i in the F-Min treatment when CC players 
Select Cooperation solely based on Partners’ Last-round Action Choices 
The two distributions in each panel below are significantly different according to a two-sided Mann-
Whitney test (p < .00001). These test results suggest that i has material incentives to act according to the 
CC strategy unless the number of the AD players is more than or equal to six. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
(a) When all the seven other members use the CC strategy (b) When six use the CC strategy and one uses the AD  strategy out of the seven other members 
(c) When five use the CC strategy and two use the AD strategy out 
of the seven other members 
(d) When four use the CC strategy and three use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(e) When three use the CC strategy and four use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(f) When two use the CC strategy and five use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
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Fig. A.3. Average Lifetime Payoffs Obtained by Player i in the C-Min treatment when CC 
players Select Cooperation solely based on Partners’ Last-round Action Choices 
The two distributions in each panel below are significantly different according to a two-sided Mann-
Whitney test (p < .00001). These test results suggest that i has material incentives to act according to the 
CC strategy unless the number of the AD players is more than or equal to four. While the symmetric 
cooperation situation is less stable compared with the F-Min treatment (see also Fig. A.2), it is much more 
stable compared with the N treatment. 
 
   
 
 
(g) When one uses the CC strategy and six use the AD strategy out 
of the seven other members 
(h) When all the seven other members use the AD strategy  
(a) When all the seven other members use the CC strategy (b) When six use the CC strategy and one uses the AD  strategy out of the seven other members 
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(c) When five use the CC strategy and two use the AD strategy out 
of the seven other members 
(d) When four use the CC strategy and three use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(e) When three use the CC strategy and four use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(f) When two use the CC strategy and five use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(g) When one uses the CC strategy and six use the AD strategy out 
of the seven other members 
(h) When all the seven other members use the AD strategy  
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While the simulations in Figs. A.2 and A.3 were performed based on the simplest 
conditional strategy, there are a number of conditional cooperative strategies a player can take. 
Additional simulations suggest that the effectiveness of endogenous monitoring is more robust to 
the kinds of cooperative strategies a subject follows when reporting is free than costly. For 
example, one straightforward way to define the CC strategy is that a CC player adjusts action 
choices over time based on all her experiences so far in a given supergame as follows:  
 
Assumption 3: When a CC player i is matched with an unmasked person in round t, she 
conditions her action choice on the partner’s action chosen for round t – 1 in the following way: 
 If the partner has cooperated (defected) in round t – 1 and i has interaction experiences 
with such a partner in the past, i will select cooperation in round t with a probability that 
her previously-matched unmasked partners, whose last-round choice was cooperation, 
selected cooperation.  
 The CC player i will select cooperation with a probability of 80% in round t when she 
has no relevant experiences in a given situation (e.g., in round 1 or when i meets for the 
first time with a person whose last-round action choice was cooperation).  
The CC player’s decision towards masked partners is the same as defined in Assumption 1. 
 
For example, suppose that a CC player i has interacted with those whose last-round 
action choice was cooperation five times so far in a given infinitely repeated game and that three 
out of the five persons selected cooperation to i. Suppose that i is now (in round t) matched with 
an unmasked member who selected cooperation in round t – 1. i will then select cooperation with 
a probability of 60% (= 3/5×100). In sum, under this assumption, CC players take all of their 
previous relevant experiences into account when deciding whether to cooperate. Assumption 2(b) 
is the extreme opposite to Assumption 3, in that CC players do not consider any experiences and 
just mimic their unmasked partner’s last-round action choices. Subjects’ actual conditional 
behaviors can be considered somewhere in the middle between Assumptions 2(b) and 3. 
 
A simulation was conducted by assuming that AD player’s behaviors are the same as in 
Assumption 2(c). It interestingly revealed that while a cooperative equilibrium exists in both the 
F-Min and C-Min treatments, the strategy relying on own interaction experiences in fact 
performed worse, compared with the simplified tit-for-tat-like strategy defined in Assumption 
2(b). The reason is that, with such stochastic action choices, CC players fail to cooperate with 
other CC players with some probabilities. Losses from such mistakes gradually accumulated 
over the course of the plays. In addition, CC players mistakenly select cooperation with some 
probabilities when matched with AD players (notice that some CC players may select 
cooperation toward a person with a record of last-round defection with some probabilities). This 
simulation outcome is similar to the well-known simulation exercises by Axelrod and Hamilton 
(1981). Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) internationally solicited strategies that could help sustain 
cooperation (in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game under partner matching) from 
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game theorists in economics, sociology, political science, mathematics, evolutionary biology, 
physics, computer science, and also computer hobbyists, and then conducted two computer 
tournaments in sequence. Among the numerous strategies proposed, “some of the strategies were 
quite intricate. An example is one which on each move models the behavior of the other player as 
a Markov process, and then uses Bayesian inference to select what seems the best choice for the 
long run.” (page 1393). However, the two tournaments both found that the simplest tit for tat 
strategy, which was proposed by Professor Anatol Rapoport, performed the best.   
 
However, the negative effects differ by treatment. On the one hand, the symmetric 
cooperation situation is still quite stable in the F-Min treatment. Fig. A.4 indicates that CC 
players have no material incentives to switch to the AD strategy unless more than or equal to five 
group members deviate to the AD strategy. On the other hand, in the C-Min treatment, the 
symmetric cooperation situation is as volatile as in the N treatment. Fig. A.5 suggests that as 
soon as more than one person acts according to the AD strategy, no one has incentives to behave 
according to the CC strategy. These simulations thus suggest the following predictions:  
 
(i) The average cooperation rate is higher in the F-Min than in the N treatment.  
(ii) The average cooperation rate is higher in the F-Min than in the C-Min treatment. 
 
The effectiveness of costly reporting highly depends on what strategy CC players select. Hence, 
a clear prediction cannot be provided for a comparison between the N and C-Min treatments. 
 
Fig. A.4. Average Lifetime Payoffs Obtained by Player i in the F-Min treatment when CC players 
Select Cooperation Stochastically based on their Own Experiences and the Partner’s 
Reputational Information 
The two distributions in each panel below are significantly different according to a two-sided Mann-
Whitney test (p < .00001), except for panel e. p (two-sided) = .2937 for panel e. These test results suggest 
that a conditional cooperator does not have material incentives to switch to the AD strategy unless the 
number of the AD players is more than or equal to five. 
   
 
(a) When all the seven other members use the CC strategy (b) When six use the CC strategy and one uses the AD strategy out of the seven other members 
18 
 
 
   
 
 
    
 
    
 
 
 
(c) When five use the CC strategy and two use the AD strategy out 
of the seven other members 
(d) When four use the CC strategy and three use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(e) When three use the CC strategy and four use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(f) When two use the CC strategy and five use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(g) When one uses the CC strategy and six use the AD strategy out 
of the seven other members 
(h) When all the seven other members use the AD strategy  
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Fig. A.5. Average Lifetime Payoffs Obtained by Player i in the C-Min treatment when CC players 
Select Cooperation Stochastically based on their Own Experiences and the Partner’s Reputational 
Information 
The two distributions in each panel below are significantly different according to a two-sided Mann-
Whitney test (p < .00001). These test results suggest that i does not have material incentives to act 
according to the CC strategy unless the number of the AD players is less than or equal to one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) When all the seven other members use the CC strategy (b) When six use the CC strategy and one uses the AD strategy out of the seven other members 
(c) When five use the CC strategy and two use the AD strategy out 
of the seven other members 
(d) When four use the CC strategy and three use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(e) When three use the CC strategy and four use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(f) When two use the CC strategy and five use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
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As discussed, it can be assumed that real subjects’ conditional cooperative behaviors are 
somewhere in the middle between Assumptions 2(b) and 3. It is worth noting that if a strategy 
taken by the CC players is defined somewhere between Assumptions 2(b) and 3, the stability of 
the cooperative equilibrium is also characterized somewhere in the middle between the ones 
described by Figs. A.3 and A.5 (Figs. A.2 and A.4). As an illustration, another simulation was 
conducted for the C-Min treatment by assuming the CC players’ strategy as follows: 
 A CC player j selects cooperation with a probability of 80% in round 1 (when she has no 
experiences in a given indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game).  
 A CC player j selects cooperation with a probability of 100% (0%) when the partner 
selected cooperation (defection) in the last round, it was reported but j does not have any 
relevant experiences in the situation. 
 A CC player j selects cooperation as defined in Assumption 3 if she is matched with an 
unmasked person who selected cooperation (defection) in the last round and she has 
already interacted with such a person in the past. 
The simulation reveals that under costly reporting, a player i does not have material incentives to 
act according to the CC strategy unless the number of the AD players is less than or equal to two, 
whose condition is a little less strict compared with the simulation result summarized in Fig. A.5. 
See the following three graphs that compare the distributions of a player i’s average lifetime 
payoffs when she acts according to the AD versus CC strategy, given the seven other members’ 
strategy choices. The two distributions in each of the three panels on the next page are 
significantly different according to a two-sided Mann-Whitney test (p < .00001). 
  
(g) When one uses the CC strategy and six use the AD strategy out 
of the seven other members 
(h) When all the seven other members use the AD strategy  
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There are eight situations regarding the seven other members’ strategy choices. The results for 
the other five situations are omitted to conserve the space.   
(a) When five use the CC strategy and two use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(b) When four use the CC strategy and three use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(c) When three use the CC strategy and four use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
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A.2.3. C-Full and F-Full treatments 
In round t, subjects in the C-Full and F-Full treatments are aware of their matched 
partners’ action choices in all previous rounds in which the partners were reported. While CC 
players in these treatments can act according to the simple tit-for-tat-like strategy based on the 
last-round information as described in Assumption 2(b) of Section A.2.2, they can adopt a more 
sophisticated discriminatory strategy such that they condition their cooperation decisions on all 
the previous rounds in which the partners were reported (Assumption 4). This strategy 
strengthens the positive effects of conditionality found in Section A.2.2.  
     
Assumption 4: When matched with a person with some history information, a CC player selects 
cooperation stochastically with a probability that the partner selected cooperation in previous 
rounds in which he was reported. When matched with someone without any history information, 
the CC player selects cooperation stochastically with a probability that her previous masked 
partners selected cooperation so far in a given supergame (as defined in Assumption 1 in the 
context of the N treatment). 
 
For example, suppose that a CC player i is matched with someone with history 
information. Suppose also that the record indicates that the partner selected cooperation in five 
out of eight reported rounds so far. Under this circumstance, Assumption 4 indicates that i selects 
cooperation with a probability of 5/8×100 = 62.5%. A simulation analysis, summarized in Figs. 
A.6 and A.7, found that this sophisticated conditional strategy magnifies the stability of a 
cooperative equilibrium, whether reporting is free or costly, compared with the ones discussed in 
Section A.2.2. This effect was driven by the increased quantity of reputational information, 
thereby enabling CC players to discriminate group members more accurately. This feature, 
hence, makes the CC strategy more profitable than the AD strategy thanks to the improved 
coordination device.  
 
In summary, this simulation exercise suggests that having a public record of reported 
action choices may further help improve cooperation, thus providing the following predictions:  
 
(i) The average cooperation rate is higher in the F-Full than in the F-Min treatment.  
(ii) The average cooperation rate is higher in the C-Full than in the C-Min treatment. 
 
It is worth noting here that despite (i), the impact of having a publicly available record under free 
reporting (if any) may be small, considering the simulation result that free reporting has a strong 
effect even in the absence of such a record (see the discussion made in Section A.2.2). 
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Fig. A.6. Average Lifetime Payoffs Obtained by Player i in the F-Full treatment 
The two distributions in each panel below are significantly different according to a two-sided Mann-
Whitney test (p < .00001). These test results suggest that i has material incentives to act according to the 
CC strategy unless all the seven other members are the AD players. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
(a) When all the seven other members use the CC strategy (b) When six use the CC strategy and one uses the AD strategy out of the seven other members 
(c) When five use the CC strategy and two use the AD strategy out 
of the seven other members 
(d) When four use the CC strategy and three use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(e) When three use the CC strategy and four use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
(f) When two use the CC strategy and five use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
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 Fig. A.7. Average Lifetime Payoffs Obtained by Player i in the C-Full treatment 
The two distributions in each panel below are significantly different according to a two-sided Mann-
Whitney test (p < .00001), except for panel f. p (two-sided) = .8259 for panel f. These test results suggest 
that a conditional cooperator does not have material incentives to switch to the AD strategy unless the 
number of the AD players is more than five. 
  
 
  
 
(g) When one uses the CC strategy and six use the AD strategy out 
of the seven other members 
(h) When all the seven other members use the AD strategy  
(a) When all the seven other members use the CC strategy (b) When six use the CC strategy and one uses the AD strategy out of the seven other members 
(c) When five use the CC strategy and two use the AD strategy out 
of the seven other members 
(d) When four use the CC strategy and three use the AD strategy 
out of the seven other members 
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Appendix B: Additional Tables and Figures  
Fig. B.1: Average Cooperation Rate in the First and Second Halves of the Experiment 
(supplementing Fig. 2 of the paper) 
 
 
 
 
Notes: p-values (two-sided) were calculated based on subject random effects probit regressions with robust bootstrapped 
standard errors (300 replications). In the regressions, the length of previous supergame was controlled as an independent 
variable for observations after the first supergame while having a dummy which equals 1 for the first supergame. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Fig. B.2: Average Reporting Rates, Supergame by Supergame (supplementing Table 2 of the paper) 
 
 
 
Notes: p-values (two-sided) indicate significance of the across-supergame trends in a given treatment. Each p-value was calculated based on a subject random 
effects probit regression with robust bootstrapped standard errors (300 replications), in which the dependent variable is a subject’s decision to report in a given 
round, and the supergame number variable is an independent variable. For example, these calculation suggest that subjects learned to engage in reporting in 
round 1 from supergame to supergame in the C-Full treatment (panel i). In the regressions, the length of previous supergame was controlled as an independent 
variable for observations after the first supergame while having a dummy which equals 1 for the first supergame. Appendix Table B.2 reports the trends of 
supergame-average reporting rates by stage game outcome. 
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01.  
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Fig. B.3: Strategy Choices, Supergame by Supergame (supplementing Fig. 4 of the paper) 
A structural estimation of subjects’ strategy choices was performed using exactly the same set of strategies 
included in Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) as a preliminary analysis. The set of strategies were as follows: 
AD: an AD subject always selects defection unconditionally. 
AC: an AC subject always selects cooperation unconditionally. 
TFT: a TFT subject cooperates (defects) in round t if her round t – 1 partner cooperated (defected). 
GT: a GT subject cooperates in round t as long as her all matched partners so far selected cooperation. 
WSLS: a WSLS subject decides whether to cooperate in round t based on the outcome in round t–1. If either 
both cooperated or neither cooperate, then she cooperates; otherwise she defects. 
T2: a defection by the other triggers two rounds of defection, after which the strategy of a T2 player goes back 
to cooperation. 
 
Note: The percentage written in each region indicates the average percentage in which a given strategy was used by 
subjects across the six supergames. The detail of the estimation result can be found in Appendix Table B.3. As 
discussed in the paper, strategy choices were estimated while amending the set of strategies for endogenous 
monitoring by having a strategy that assumes a subject utilizes partners’ reputations (Fig. 4 of the paper). 
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Table B.1: Cooperation Trends by Treatment (supplementing Fig. 3 of the paper) 
 
Dependent variable: A dummy that equals 1(0) if a subject chose to cooperate (defect) in round t 
  
         
Treatment: 
Independent  
variables: 
N treatment C-Min treatment F-Min treatment 
Round 1 
(1) 
First block 
(2) 
All rounds 
(3) 
Round 1 
(4) 
First block 
(5) 
All rounds 
(6) 
Round 1 
(7) 
First block 
(8) 
All rounds 
(9) 
          
          Supergame number {= 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6} 
-.142 
(.091) 
-.116*** 
(.043) 
-.103*** 
(.038) 
.031 
(.086) 
-.034 
(.041) 
-.049 
(.040) 
.030 
(.112) 
.090** 
(.046) 
.117** 
(.048) 
Rounds within supergame --- -.103*** (.017) 
-.012*** 
(.002) --- 
-.091*** 
(.013) 
-.011*** 
(.002) --- 
-.077*** 
(.012) 
-.028*** 
(.004) 
1st supergame dummy {= 1 
for the first supergame; 0, 
otherwise} 
.007 
(.401) 
-.146 
(.179) 
-.278 
(.172) 
.916** 
(.399) 
.564*** 
(.173) 
.243 
(.148) 
-.290 
(.459) 
.488** 
(.249) 
.424* 
(.242) 
Previous supergame length -.011* 
(.006) 
-.0004 
(.003) 
-.0005 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.005) 
.001 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.003) 
-.028* 
(.017) 
.003 
(.008) 
-.001 
(.009) 
Constant .522 
(.510) 
.358 
(.295) 
-.154 
(.236) 
.190 
(.512) 
.024 
(.286) 
-.236 
(.267) 
1.472** 
(.743) 
.084 
(.275) 
-.198 
(.293) 
          # of Observations 432 4,320 9,120 384 3,840 10,080 384 3,840 7,336 
Wald chi-squared 8.30 41.54 57.48 10.31 63.53 47.79 4.22 46.39 57.91 
Prob > Wald chi-squared .0402 .0000 .0000 .0161 .0000 .0000 .2390 .0000 .0000 
          
Notes: Subject random effects probit regressions with robust bootstrapped standard errors (300 replications).  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, 
at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Treatment: 
Independent  
variables: 
C-Full treatment F-Full treatment 
Round 1 
(10) 
First block 
(11) 
All rounds 
(12) 
Round 1 
(13) 
First block 
(14) 
All rounds 
(15) 
       
       Supergame number {= 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6} 
.179** 
(.076) 
.110*** 
(.029) 
.149*** 
(.030) 
-.021 
(.083) 
.022 
(.026) 
.022 
(.024) 
Rounds within supergame --- -.068*** (.012) 
-.019*** 
(.003) --- 
-.076*** 
(.009) 
-.003* 
(.001) 
1st supergame dummy {= 1 
for the first supergame; 0, 
otherwise} 
.530 
(.380) 
.283* 
(.154) 
.401*** 
(.142) 
.148 
(.389) 
.078 
(.104) 
-.093 
(.094) 
Previous supergame length .002 
(.009) 
-.001 
(.005) 
-.002 
(.004) 
.009 
(.008) 
.007*** 
(.002) 
.002 
(.001) 
Constant -.026 
(.413) 
-.188 
(.188) 
-.626 
(.157) 
1.000*** 
(.467) 
.406** 
(.160) 
.037 
(.129) 
       # of Observations 384 3,840 6,480 408 4,080 10,320 
Wald chi-squared 5.53 43.01 66.43 1.52 73.67 25.30 
Prob > Wald chi-squared .1368 .0000 .0000 .6775 .0000 .0000 
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Table B.2: Average Reporting Rates by Stage Game Outcome, Supergame by supergame 
(supplementing Table 3 of the paper) 
(A) Average reporting rates in round 1 
treatment  Average SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 
F-Min all data 76.0% 72.7% 77.3% 73.4% 76.6% 80.0% 80.0% 
 
cooperator-cooperator reporting 86.3% 79.5% 77.8% 86.7% 90.6% 95.0% 100% 
 
cooperator-defector reporting 82.1% 94.4% 95.2% 83.3% 75.0% 62.5% 42.9% 
 
defector-cooperator reporting 59.0% 44.4% 66.7% 58.3% 50.0% 75.0% 71.4% 
 
defector-defector reporting 54.3% 50.0% 60.0% 40.0% 62.5% 50.0% 66.7% 
         
C-Min all data 28.1% 20.3% 23.4% 28.1% 35.9% 28.1% 32.8% 
 
cooperator-cooperator reporting 31.5% 15.6% 33.3% 22.7% 50.0% 37.5% 43.8% 
 
cooperator-defector reporting 47.9% 61.5% 46.2% 50.0% 47.1% 30.0% 58.8% 
 
defector-cooperator reporting 19.1% 0.0% 23.1% 21.4% 29.4% 20.0% 17.6% 
 
defector-defector reporting 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 21.4% 0.0% 25.0% 7.1% 
         
F-Full all data 74.0% 69.4% 75.0% 77.8% 76.4% 76.4% 66.7% 
 
cooperator-cooperator reporting 82.0% 71.1% 80.6% 93.8% 85.7% 84.1% 71.4% 
 
cooperator-defector reporting 85.1% 100.0% 80.0% 88.9% 71.4% 90.9% 80.0% 
 
defector-cooperator reporting 44.8% 35.7% 53.3% 44.4% 50.0% 45.5% 40.0% 
 
defector-defector reporting 9.7% 66.7% 83.3% 50.0% 100.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
         
C-Full all data 41.9% 28.1% 29.7% 42.2% 54.7% 46.9% 50.0% 
 
cooperator-cooperator reporting 48.9% 18.8% 26.9% 61.5% 67.9% 55.9% 61.8% 
 
cooperator-defector reporting 77.8% 70.0% 90.9% 61.5% 81.3% 80.0% 83.3% 
 
defector-cooperator reporting 13.9% 40.0% 9.1% 15.4% 18.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
defector-defector reporting 11.7% 8.3% 6.3% 8.3% 0.0% 30.0% 16.7% 
 
(B) Average reporting rates in the first block 
treatment  Average SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 
F-Min all data 72.6% 73.8% 71.0% 68.4% 74.8% 74.5% 75.0% 
 
cooperator-cooperator reporting 86.5% 82.8% 81.5% 86.9% 92.7% 88.1% 91.8% 
 
cooperator-defector reporting 77.6% 82.6% 78.9% 74.5% 76.5% 72.2% 74.6% 
 
defector-cooperator reporting 67.3% 64.1% 70.2% 61.3% 73.5% 67.1% 67.8% 
 
defector-defector reporting 55.3% 58.6% 56.8% 50.5% 54.4% 54.1% 57.3% 
  
       
C-Min all data 23.5% 18.0% 21.9% 24.5% 26.4% 24.5% 25.5% 
 
cooperator-cooperator reporting 36.6% 15.8% 27.1% 42.6% 50.8% 45.9% 58.3% 
 
cooperator-defector reporting 42.4% 44.0% 44.8% 40.9% 42.5% 38.0% 44.3% 
 
defector-cooperator reporting 19.1% 8.0% 21.6% 17.4% 23.6% 20.9% 23.0% 
 
defector-defector reporting 9.4% 8.9% 9.1% 11.0% 7.4% 9.6% 10.3% 
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F-Full all data 74.2% 71.5% 73.6% 75.3% 76.4% 78.1% 68.8% 
 
cooperator-cooperator reporting 84.8% 74.6% 82.6% 87.5% 86.8% 90.1% 82.5% 
 
cooperator-defector reporting 79.7% 83.3% 78.9% 77.0% 79.0% 83.2% 76.5% 
 
defector-cooperator reporting 52.9% 54.2% 61.0% 54.0% 58.1% 47.4% 39.2% 
 
defector-defector reporting 69.2% 71.9% 66.7% 68.6% 68.5% 67.6% 72.4% 
  
       
C-Full all data 30.8% 27.5% 26.1% 28.8% 34.4% 35.2% 33.1% 
 
cooperator-cooperator reporting 38.6% 23.8% 22.1% 42.5% 44.1% 44.4% 43.3% 
 
cooperator-defector reporting 59.8% 51.1% 61.6% 58.0% 66.3% 63.0% 62.0% 
 
defector-cooperator reporting 17.8% 23.4% 16.8% 13.2% 14.4% 21.5% 13.2% 
 
defector-defector reporting 17.0% 15.0% 14.4% 17.0% 19.6% 22.0% 20.7% 
 
(C) Average reporting rates for all rounds 
treatment  Average SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 
F-Min all data 71.7% 71.7% 68.8% 67.7% 76.9% 69.5% 76.6% 
 
cooperator-cooperator reporting 87.2% 84.4% 82.0% 88.5% 92.9% 86.0% 91.2% 
 
cooperator-defector reporting 75.6% 77.5% 74.2% 73.1% 77.1% 71.6% 77.4% 
 
defector-cooperator reporting 66.0% 64.1% 67.5% 56.6% 71.2% 65.1% 71.3% 
 
defector-defector reporting 57.5% 57.6% 59.6% 52.8% 58.7% 51.3% 59.3% 
  
       
C-Min all data 20.7% 19.3% 20.8% 19.4% 21.0% 21.4% 25.5% 
 
cooperator-cooperator reporting 35.5% 19.4% 30.0% 27.1% 50.7% 46.0% 58.3% 
 
cooperator-defector reporting 38.6% 40.7% 42.5% 41.8% 33.4% 39.3% 44.3% 
 
defector-cooperator reporting 17.7% 15.0% 20.1% 16.0% 22.3% 18.3% 23.0% 
 
defector-defector reporting 7.6% 9.3% 8.2% 8.3% 5.6% 8.6% 10.3% 
  
       
F-Full all data 77.5% 72.7% 75.1% 79.9% 81.0% 78.9% 70.6% 
 
cooperator-cooperator reporting 86.3% 78.5% 83.1% 87.1% 88.2% 90.7% 81.1% 
 
cooperator-defector reporting 79.3% 82.0% 82.2% 74.7% 81.0% 84.0% 76.5% 
 
defector-cooperator reporting 57.9% 55.0% 58.1% 65.2% 61.3% 54.0% 38.6% 
 
defector-defector reporting 73.6% 71.7% 72.5% 74.6% 78.1% 68.2% 75.1% 
  
       
C-Full all data 28.4% 27.5% 23.9% 26.8% 31.1% 32.0% 29.7% 
 
cooperator-cooperator reporting 39.2% 23.8% 31.2% 43.0% 46.5% 39.5% 40.5% 
 
cooperator-defector reporting 56.2% 51.1% 52.6% 53.6% 70.1% 54.4% 56.4% 
 
defector-cooperator reporting 18.0% 15.0% 17.4% 19.9% 14.3% 22.8% 18.6% 
 
defector-defector reporting 14.4% 9.3% 6.0% 6.1% 5.0% 9.3% 7.1% 
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Table B.3: Strategy Choices Regarding Cooperation, Supergame by Supergame (supplementing 
Fig. B.3 of the Appendix) 
This table summarizes the details of the structural estimation results reported in Fig. B.3. Please 
see Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) for the estimation method. This is a preliminary analysis 
performed before estimating the amended version in Fig. 4. 
 
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.407     0.064    6.366    0.000                AD 0.239     0.095    2.523    0.006                AD 0.251     0.121    2.072    0.019                
AC 0.136     0.089    1.522    0.064                AC 0.261     0.116    2.254    0.012                AC 0.328     0.109    3.006    0.001                
GT 0.168     0.074    2.281    0.011                GT 0.193     0.132    1.467    0.071                GT 0.145     0.102    1.419    0.078                
TFT 0.278     0.107    2.591    0.005                TFT 0.230     0.092    2.500    0.006                TFT 0.230     0.081    2.851    0.002                
WSLS 0.011     0.088    0.125    0.450                WSLS 0.077     0.094    0.825    0.205                WSLS 0.046     0.093    0.497    0.309                
T2 0.000     0.025    0.000    0.500                T2 0.000     0.051    0.000    0.500                T2 0.000     0.038    0.000    0.500                
Gamma 0.588     Gamma 0.659     Gamma 0.654     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.399     0.065    6.111    0.000                AD 0.481     0.052    9.183    0.000 AD 0.345     0.082    4.190    0.000                
AC 0.091     0.105    0.868    0.193                AC 0.269     0.109    2.464    0.007                AC 0.325     0.104    3.118    0.001                
GT 0.124     0.074    1.659    0.049                GT 0.130     0.095    1.379    0.084                GT 0.160     0.118    1.359    0.087                
TFT 0.344     0.085    4.068    0.000                TFT 0.097     0.085    1.141    0.127                TFT 0.170     0.112    1.516    0.065                
WSLS 0.016     0.110    0.148    0.441                WSLS 0.023     0.078    0.298    0.383                WSLS 0.000     0.091    0.000    0.500                
T2 0.026     0.027    0.964    0.168                T2 0.000     0.038    0.000    0.500                T2 0.000     0.028    0.000    0.500                
Gamma 0.578     Gamma 0.512     Gamma 0.622     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.489     0.076    6.451    0.000                AD 0.455     0.081    5.621    0.000                AD 0.294     0.081    3.652    0.000                
AC 0.110     0.124    0.887    0.188                AC 0.276     0.099    2.787    0.003                AC 0.266     0.107    2.478    0.007                
GT 0.132     0.103    1.277    0.101                GT 0.077     0.117    0.657    0.255                GT 0.203     0.138    1.470    0.071                
TFT 0.269     0.091    2.968    0.002                TFT 0.162     0.069    2.360    0.009                TFT 0.142     0.118    1.207    0.114                
WSLS 0.000     0.129    0.000    0.500                WSLS 0.006     0.082    0.071    0.472                WSLS 0.046     0.076    0.605    0.273                
T2 0.000     0.000    0.292    0.385                T2 0.024     0.022    1.073    0.142                T2 0.048     0.053    0.904    0.183                
Gamma 0.526     Gamma 0.560     Gamma 0.509     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.424     0.049    8.731    0.000 AD 0.418     0.077    5.391    0.000                AD 0.317     0.066    4.812    0.000                
AC 0.170     0.125    1.359    0.087                AC 0.252     0.091    2.754    0.003                AC 0.363     0.114    3.187    0.001                
GT 0.168     0.107    1.566    0.059                GT 0.145     0.115    1.262    0.103                GT 0.058     0.121    0.475    0.317                
TFT 0.238     0.105    2.273    0.012                TFT 0.165     0.080    2.064    0.019                TFT 0.221     0.051    4.299    0.000                
WSLS 0.000     0.087    0.000    0.500                WSLS 0.021     0.083    0.254    0.400                WSLS 0.042     0.092    0.450    0.326                
T2 0.000     0.003    0.000    0.500                T2 0.000     0.052    0.000    0.500                T2 0.000     0.093    0.000    0.500                
Gamma 0.429     Gamma 0.657     Gamma 0.505     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.509     0.095    5.382    0.000                AD 0.480     0.080    5.989    0.000                AD 0.280     0.087    3.199    0.001                
AC 0.121     0.183    0.662    0.254                AC 0.236     0.086    2.735    0.003                AC 0.385     0.125    3.086    0.001                
GT 0.171     0.102    1.672    0.047                GT 0.063     0.079    0.795    0.213                GT 0.039     0.118    0.331    0.370                
TFT 0.199     0.105    1.901    0.029                TFT 0.155     0.070    2.213    0.013                TFT 0.226     0.069    3.259    0.001                
WSLS 0.000     0.132    0.000    0.500                WSLS 0.065     0.069    0.946    0.172                WSLS 0.000     0.090    0.000    0.500                
T2 0.000     0.005    0.000    0.500                T2 0.000     0.058    0.000    0.500                T2 0.070     0.009    7.700    0.000                
Gamma 0.523     Gamma 0.563     Gamma 0.590     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.579     0.104    5.569    0.000                AD 0.476     0.053    8.914    0.000 AD 0.315     0.087    3.626    0.000                
AC 0.129     0.128    1.008    0.157                AC 0.178     0.102    1.742    0.041                AC 0.299     0.170    1.759    0.039                
GT 0.053     0.059    0.890    0.187                GT 0.177     0.067    2.636    0.004                GT 0.063     0.152    0.413    0.340                
TFT 0.218     0.085    2.564    0.005                TFT 0.118     0.104    1.136    0.128                TFT 0.282     0.054    5.243    0.000                
WSLS 0.022     0.125    0.173    0.431                WSLS 0.051     0.075    0.676    0.249                WSLS 0.042     0.086    0.489    0.313                
T2 0.000     0.028    0.000    0.500                T2 0.000     0.062    0.000    0.500                T2 0.000     0.037    0.000    0.500                
Gamma 0.532     Gamma 0.514     Gamma 0.650     
e. 5th supergamee. 5th supergame
d. 4th supergame d. 4th supergame d. 4th supergame
I. N treatment II. C-Min treatment III. F-Min treatment
a. 1st supergame a. 1st supergame a. 1st supergame
b. 2nd supergame b. 2nd supergame b. 2nd supergame
c. 3rd supergame c. 3rd supergame
f. 6th supergame f. 6th supergame
e. 5th supergame
f. 6th supergame
c. 3rd supergame
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fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.315     0.161    1.952    0.025                AD 0.253     0.147    1.724    0.042                
AC 0.348     0.117    2.963    0.002                AC 0.340     0.112    3.048    0.001                
GT 0.203     0.178    1.144    0.126                GT 0.190     0.186    1.026    0.152                
TFT 0.134     0.110    1.219    0.112                TFT 0.103     0.133    0.770    0.221                
WSLS 0.000     0.082    0.000    0.500                WSLS 0.094     0.064    1.461    0.072                
T2 0.000     0.030    0.000    0.500                T2 0.020     0.108    0.183    0.427                
Gamma 0.800     Gamma 0.975     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.481     0.123    3.902    0.000                AD 0.296     0.182    1.624    0.052                
AC 0.085     0.091    0.935    0.175                AC 0.224     0.123    1.813    0.035                
GT 0.242     0.073    3.311    0.000                GT 0.091     0.148    0.615    0.269                
TFT 0.071     0.101    0.709    0.239                TFT 0.084     0.084    1.007    0.157                
WSLS 0.075     0.066    1.135    0.128                WSLS 0.139     0.062    2.231    0.013                
T2 0.046     0.060    0.761    0.223                T2 0.166     0.080    2.062    0.020                
Gamma 0.804     Gamma 0.861     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.409     0.182    2.241    0.013                AD 0.250     0.176    1.417    0.078                
AC 0.225     0.103    2.192    0.014                AC 0.574     0.131    4.389    0.000                
GT 0.136     0.114    1.191    0.117                GT 0.073     0.185    0.393    0.347                
TFT 0.169     0.102    1.666    0.048                TFT 0.045     0.076    0.591    0.277                
WSLS 0.061     0.109    0.558    0.288                WSLS 0.058     0.075    0.776    0.219                
T2 0.000     0.078    0.000    0.500                T2 0.000     0.093    0.000    0.500                
Gamma 0.688     Gamma 0.892     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.343     0.089    3.849    0.000                AD 0.238     0.199    1.198    0.115                
AC 0.417     0.086    4.847    0.000                AC 0.520     0.124    4.190    0.000                
GT 0.144     0.102    1.407    0.080                GT 0.159     0.185    0.862    0.194                
TFT 0.051     0.080    0.641    0.261                TFT 0.059     0.121    0.487    0.313                
WSLS 0.011     0.088    0.127    0.449                WSLS 0.024     0.060    0.396    0.346                
T2 0.034     0.046    0.725    0.234                T2 0.000     0.032    0.000    0.500                
Gamma 0.568     Gamma 0.846     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.351     0.169    2.071    0.019                AD 0.255     0.216    1.177    0.120                
AC 0.315     0.126    2.504    0.006                AC 0.428     0.121    3.547    0.000                
GT 0.138     0.139    0.994    0.160                GT 0.132     0.197    0.672    0.251                
TFT 0.032     0.096    0.332    0.370                TFT 0.100     0.106    0.944    0.173                
WSLS 0.109     0.048    2.285    0.011                WSLS 0.070     0.067    1.057    0.145                
T2 0.056     0.105    0.528    0.299                T2 0.014     0.067    0.211    0.416                
Gamma 0.771     Gamma 0.745     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.279     0.143    1.949    0.026                AD 0.476     0.128    3.704    0.000                
AC 0.456     0.108    4.236    0.000                AC 0.259     0.101    2.557    0.005                
GT 0.181     0.135    1.337    0.091                GT 0.031     0.126    0.247    0.402                
TFT 0.042     0.096    0.433    0.333                TFT 0.142     0.091    1.568    0.058                
WSLS 0.043     0.053    0.815    0.208                WSLS 0.091     0.071    1.288    0.099                
T2 0.000     0.057    0.000    0.500                T2 0.000     0.117    0.000    0.500                
Gamma 0.739     Gamma 0.905     
6th supergame 6th supergame
5th supergame5th supergame
3rd supergame 3rd supergame
4th supergame 4th supergame
V. F-Full treatmentIV. C-Full treatment
1st supergame 1st supergame
2nd supergame 2nd supergame
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The following summarizes test results to compare subjects’ strategy choices among the 
treatments based on the tables in the previous two pages. 
 (i) % of the subjects who acted according to 
the AD strategy 
 (ii) % of the subjects who acted according to the 
AC strategy 
 N C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full  N C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full 
N --- .6141 .0295** .2164 .0325**  --- .0726* .0028*** .0095*** .0003*** 
C-Min --- --- .1130 .4750 .1140  --- --- .2670 .4256 .0690* 
F-Min --- --- --- .4158 .9386  --- --- --- .7940 .4078 
C-Full --- --- --- --- .3967  --- --- --- --- .3117 
F-Full --- --- --- --- ---  --- --- --- --- --- 
 
 
 (iii) % of the subjects who acted according to 
the GT strategy 
 (iv) % of the subjects who acted according to the 
TFT strategy 
 N C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full  N C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full 
N --- .9318 .6310 .5399 .6760  --- .1407 .4933 .0074*** .0074*** 
C-Min --- --- .7073 .4987 .7484  --- --- .3745 .2084 .2372 
F-Min --- --- --- .2655 .9682  --- --- --- .0312** .0332** 
C-Full --- --- --- --- .3086  --- --- --- --- .9010 
F-Full --- --- --- --- ---  --- --- --- --- --- 
 
Notes: The numbers are p-values (two-sided) based on two-sample tests of proportions. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. The percentages of those who selected 
the WSLS strategy or the T2 strategy were less than 10% in all treatments, whereby making treatment comparisons 
not meaningful.  
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Table B.4: Strategy Choices Regarding Cooperation, Supergame by Supergame (supplementing 
Fig. 4 of the paper) 
This table summarizes the details of the structural estimation results reported in Fig. 4 of the 
paper. See the paper for the definition of each strategy.  
 
 
 
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.407     0.064    6.366    0.000                AD 0.230     0.106    2.168    0.015                AD 0.255     0.114    2.246    0.012                
AC 0.136     0.089    1.522    0.064                AC 0.259     0.117    2.210    0.014                AC 0.322     0.121    2.665    0.004                
GT 0.168     0.074    2.281    0.011                SGT 0.125     0.073    1.702    0.044                SGT 0.042     0.094    0.450    0.326                
TFT 0.278     0.107    2.591    0.005                TFT 0.223     0.089    2.503    0.006                TFT 0.220     0.062    3.556    0.000                
WSLS 0.011     0.088    0.125    0.450                WSLS 0.083     0.093    0.889    0.187                WSLS 0.047     0.096    0.491    0.312                
T2 0.000     0.025    0.000    0.500                Reputation 0.080     0.047    1.720    0.043                Reputation 0.113     0.040    2.850    0.002                
Gamma 0.588     Gamma 0.658     Gamma 0.640     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.399     0.065    6.111    0.000                AD 0.478     0.051    9.373    0.000 AD 0.337     0.064    5.263    0.000                
AC 0.091     0.105    0.868    0.193                AC 0.274     0.116    2.354    0.009                AC 0.259     0.107    2.415    0.008                
GT 0.124     0.074    1.659    0.049                SGT 0.020     0.092    0.216    0.414                SGT 0.023     0.097    0.234    0.408                
TFT 0.344     0.085    4.068    0.000                TFT 0.125     0.075    1.662    0.048                TFT 0.119     0.039    3.080    0.001                
WSLS 0.016     0.110    0.148    0.441                WSLS 0.006     0.079    0.073    0.471                WSLS 0.000     0.091    0.000    0.500                
T2 0.026     0.027    0.964    0.168                Reputation 0.097     0.024    4.119    0.000                Reputation 0.262     0.000    >100 0.000                
Gamma 0.578     Gamma 0.513     Gamma 0.543     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.489     0.076    6.451    0.000                AD 0.418     0.062    6.774    0.000                AD 0.294     0.078    3.773    0.000                
AC 0.110     0.124    0.887    0.188                AC 0.274     0.103    2.672    0.004                AC 0.268     0.106    2.529    0.006                
GT 0.132     0.103    1.277    0.101                SGT 0.004     0.106    0.033    0.487                SGT 0.104     0.095    1.094    0.137                
TFT 0.269     0.091    2.968    0.002                TFT 0.151     0.036    4.182    0.000                TFT 0.149     0.083    1.787    0.037                
WSLS 0.000     0.129    0.000    0.500                WSLS 0.007     0.082    0.084    0.466                WSLS 0.023     0.070    0.322    0.374                
T2 0.000     0.000    0.292    0.385                Reputation 0.147     0.024    6.130    0.000                Reputation 0.163     0.041    3.956    0.000                
Gamma 0.526     Gamma 0.543     Gamma 0.493     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.424     0.049    8.731    0.000 AD 0.362     0.068    5.362    0.000                AD 0.300     0.078    3.846    0.000                
AC 0.170     0.125    1.359    0.087                AC 0.234     0.088    2.649    0.004                AC 0.331     0.091    3.628    0.000                
GT 0.168     0.107    1.566    0.059                SGT 0.087     0.114    0.764    0.222                SGT 0.038     0.085    0.446    0.328                
TFT 0.238     0.105    2.273    0.012                TFT 0.083     0.071    1.172    0.121                TFT 0.120     0.033    3.585    0.000                
WSLS 0.000     0.087    0.000    0.500                WSLS 0.023     0.067    0.340    0.367                WSLS 0.000     0.066    0.000    0.500                
T2 0.000     0.003    0.000    0.500                Reputation 0.211     0.043    4.909    0.000                Reputation 0.211     0.095    2.219    0.013                
Gamma 0.429     Gamma 0.624     Gamma 0.460     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.509     0.095    5.382    0.000                AD 0.448     0.067    6.716    0.000                AD 0.292     0.065    4.483    0.000                
AC 0.121     0.183    0.662    0.254                AC 0.236     0.095    2.492    0.006                AC 0.418     0.096    4.355    0.000                
GT 0.171     0.102    1.672    0.047                SGT 0.103     0.080    1.282    0.100                SGT 0.000     0.090    0.000    0.500                
TFT 0.199     0.105    1.901    0.029                TFT 0.148     0.088    1.684    0.046                TFT 0.239     0.000    >100 0.000                
WSLS 0.000     0.132    0.000    0.500                WSLS 0.065     0.071    0.919    0.179                WSLS 0.000     0.096    0.000    0.500                
T2 0.000     0.005    0.000    0.500                Reputation 0.000     0.056    0.000    0.500                Reputation 0.051     0.017    2.987    0.001                
Gamma 0.523     Gamma 0.560     Gamma 0.581     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.579     0.104    5.569    0.000                AD 0.448     0.048    9.338    0.000 AD 0.278     0.094    2.977    0.001                
AC 0.129     0.128    1.008    0.157                AC 0.164     0.103    1.596    0.055                AC 0.235     0.137    1.717    0.043                
GT 0.053     0.059    0.890    0.187                SGT 0.093     0.052    1.781    0.037                SGT 0.096     0.081    1.183    0.118                
TFT 0.218     0.085    2.564    0.005                TFT 0.120     0.093    1.284    0.100                TFT 0.256     0.074    3.479    0.000                
WSLS 0.022     0.125    0.173    0.431                WSLS 0.055     0.064    0.847    0.199                WSLS 0.048     0.082    0.589    0.278                
T2 0.000     0.028    0.000    0.500                Reputation 0.120     0.060    2.007    0.022                Reputation 0.086     0.046    1.875    0.030                
Gamma 0.532     Gamma 0.488     Gamma 0.619     
a. 1st supergame a. 1st supergame a. 1st supergame
I. N treatment II. C-Min treatment III. F-Min treatment
c. 3rd supergame c. 3rd supergame c. 3rd supergame
b. 2nd supergame b. 2nd supergame b. 2nd supergame
e. 5th supergame e. 5th supergame e. 5th supergame
d. 4th supergame d. 4th supergame d. 4th supergame
f. 6th supergame f. 6th supergame f. 6th supergame
37 
 
 
 
 
  
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.320     0.138    2.320    0.010                AD 0.190     0.163    1.159    0.123                
AC 0.306     0.128    2.379    0.009                AC 0.151     0.072    2.100    0.018                
SGT 0.079     0.111    0.717    0.237                SGT 0.110     0.080    1.379    0.084                
TFT 0.173     0.091    1.908    0.028                TFT 0.108     0.113    0.960    0.168                
WSLS 0.000     0.087    0.000    0.500                WSLS 0.055     0.070    0.794    0.214                
Reputation 0.122     0.049    2.470    0.007                Reputation 0.386     0.069    5.619    0.000                
Gamma 0.801     Gamma 0.778     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.414     0.071    5.862    0.000                AD 0.249     0.151    1.649    0.050                
AC 0.069     0.130    0.528    0.299                AC 0.086     0.112    0.764    0.222                
SGT 0.085     0.045    1.896    0.029                SGT 0.053     0.127    0.416    0.339                
TFT 0.079     0.099    0.799    0.212                TFT 0.047     0.070    0.671    0.251                
WSLS 0.021     0.059    0.352    0.362                WSLS 0.099     0.035    2.868    0.002                
Reputation 0.333     0.029    11.425  -                     Reputation 0.466     0.051    9.100    -                     
Gamma 0.693     Gamma 0.713     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.375     0.084    4.493    0.000                AD 0.241     0.099    2.442    0.007                
AC 0.164     0.127    1.298    0.097                AC 0.108     0.077    1.404    0.080                
SGT 0.067     0.105    0.637    0.262                SGT 0.008     0.057    0.146    0.442                
TFT 0.088     0.058    1.520    0.064                TFT 0.027     0.045    0.604    0.273                
WSLS 0.031     0.051    0.615    0.269                WSLS 0.031     0.040    0.757    0.224                
Reputation 0.274     0.037    7.436    0.000                Reputation 0.585     0.048    12.274  0.000                
Gamma 0.554     Gamma 0.691     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.305     0.056    5.480    0.000                AD 0.210     0.104    2.029    0.021                
AC 0.249     0.105    2.366    0.009                AC 0.134     0.107    1.256    0.105                
SGT 0.053     0.080    0.663    0.254                SGT 0.079     0.072    1.108    0.134                
TFT 0.027     0.047    0.571    0.284                TFT 0.024     0.072    0.340    0.367                
WSLS 0.029     0.049    0.599    0.275                WSLS 0.000     0.028    0.000    0.500                
Reputation 0.337     0.049    6.859    0.000                Reputation 0.552     0.000    >100 0.000                
Gamma 0.430     Gamma 0.650     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.288     0.065    4.396    0.000                AD 0.187     0.175    1.071    0.142                
AC 0.189     0.113    1.666    0.048                AC 0.165     0.087    1.896    0.029                
SGT 0.075     0.093    0.804    0.211                SGT 0.095     0.116    0.821    0.206                
TFT 0.019     0.055    0.340    0.367                TFT 0.055     0.118    0.461    0.322                
WSLS 0.038     0.040    0.953    0.170                WSLS 0.047     0.061    0.770    0.221                
Reputation 0.392     0.038    10.198  0.000                Reputation 0.451     0.054    8.334    0.000                
Gamma 0.602     Gamma 0.613     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AD 0.235     0.075    3.150    0.001                AD 0.285     0.053    5.390    0.000                
AC 0.178     0.106    1.678    0.047                AC 0.081     0.096    0.839    0.201                
SGT 0.101     0.069    1.472    0.071                SGT 0.103     0.068    1.508    0.066                
TFT 0.012     0.058    0.203    0.420                TFT 0.079     0.120    0.654    0.256                
WSLS 0.052     0.033    1.585    0.056                WSLS 0.054     0.048    1.107    0.134                
Reputation 0.422     0.047    9.006    0.000                Reputation 0.399     0.056    7.092    0.000                
Gamma 0.530     Gamma 0.661     
1st supergame 1st supergame
IV. C-Full treatment V. F-Full treatment
3rd supergame 3rd supergame
2nd supergame 2nd supergame
5th supergame 5th supergame
4th supergame 4th supergame
6th supergame 6th supergame
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The following summarizes test results to compare subjects’ strategy choices among the 
treatments based on the tables in the previous two pages. 
 (i) % of the subjects who acted according to 
the AD strategy 
 (ii) % of the subjects who acted according to the 
AC strategy 
 N C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full  N C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full 
N --- .4044 .0227** .0849* .0326**  --- .0839* .0069*** .2910 .9273 
C-Min --- --- .1804 .3832 .2110  --- --- .3770 .5094 .0695* 
F-Min --- --- --- .6918 .9780  --- --- --- .1157 .0053*** 
C-Full --- --- --- --- .7241  --- --- --- --- .2527 
F-Full --- --- --- --- ---  --- --- --- --- --- 
 
 
 (iii) % of the subjects who acted according to 
the GT or SGT strategy 
 (iv) % of the subjects who acted according to the 
TFT strategy 
 N C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full  N C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full 
N --- .2260 .0606* .2690 .2335  --- .0935* .2588 .0028*** .0009*** 
C-Min --- --- .5899 .9142 .9467  --- --- .4923 .1590 .0946* 
F-Min --- --- --- .5115 .5305  --- --- --- .0352** .0163** 
C-Full --- --- --- --- .9649  --- --- --- --- .8270 
F-Full --- --- --- --- ---  --- --- --- --- --- 
 
 
 (v) % of the subjects who acted according 
to the Rep strategy 
 C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full 
C-Min --- .4825 .0047*** .0000*** 
F-Min --- --- .0149** .0000*** 
C-Full --- --- --- .0571* 
F-Full --- --- --- --- 
 
Notes: The numbers are p-values (two-sided) based on two-sample tests of proportions. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
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Table B.5: Average Reporting Rate by Strategy Choice (supplementing Fig. 4 of the paper) 
 
 
Note: Calculation results for those who selected the WSLS strategy were omitted since the percentages of the WSLS subjects were less than 5% in all treatments 
(see Fig. 4 of the paper), whereby making comparisons not meaningful.  
C-Min treatment
SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 Average SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 Average SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 Average
AD 0.0% 8.0% 26.1% 15.8% 26.1% 11.5% 14.6% AD 9.0% 9.2% 9.6% 12.6% 11.3% 8.8% 10.1% AD 9.0% 9.0% 8.2% 10.2% 9.5% 8.8% 9.1%
GT 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 50.0% 0.0% 14.6% GT 7.6% 0.0% 10.0% 12.5% 10.0% 16.0% 9.4% GT 7.6% 0.0% 5.0% 5.9% 5.4% 16.0% 6.7%
TFT 30.8% 42.9% 44.4% 16.7% 0.0% 20.0% 25.8% TFT 22.1% 27.1% 31.1% 3.3% 22.2% 32.0% 23.0% TFT 22.1% 24.3% 23.1% 12.8% 22.2% 32.0% 22.7%
AC 25.0% 33.3% 35.3% 46.7% 35.7% 63.6% 39.9% AC 30.7% 38.0% 38.8% 46.0% 41.4% 54.5% 41.6% AC 30.7% 38.7% 35.4% 38.9% 45.5% 54.5% 40.6%
Rep 33.3% 36.4% 16.7% 57.1% 28.6% 50.0% 37.0% Rep 23.3% 20.9% 26.7% 42.1% 34.3% 29.2% 29.4% Rep 23.3% 22.7% 25.8% 32.7% 24.3% 29.2% 26.3%
F-Min treatment
SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 Average SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 Average SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 Average
AD 35.0% 65.4% 41.2% 58.8% 63.6% 70.0% 55.7% AD 48.1% 53.1% 41.2% 53.5% 52.7% 55.0% 50.6% AD 47.4% 51.0% 39.1% 52.9% 50.5% 55.5% 49.4%
GT 60.0% 71.4% 71.4% 50.0% 0.0% 60.0% 52.1% GT 66.5% 60.0% 61.4% 50.0% 0.0% 58.0% 49.3% GT 66.5% 58.1% 61.4% 50.0% 0.0% 57.0% 48.8%
TFT 94.1% 87.5% 100.0% 100.0% 83.3% 85.7% 91.8% TFT 78.7% 88.8% 91.7% 82.9% 75.0% 90.0% 84.5% TFT 77.8% 92.5% 86.7% 84.7% 75.0% 85.7% 83.7%
AC 85.7% 77.8% 88.9% 83.3% 80.0% 71.4% 81.2% AC 83.7% 75.6% 86.7% 88.9% 79.0% 78.6% 82.1% AC 83.1% 73.9% 86.4% 89.4% 76.0% 79.3% 81.4%
Rep 75.0% 88.9% 76.9% 87.5% 100.0% 100.0% 88.1% Rep 71.9% 84.1% 76.9% 87.5% 95.0% 92.9% 84.7% Rep 71.0% 83.8% 76.9% 89.5% 95.0% 91.4% 84.6%
C-Full treatment
SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 Average SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 Average SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 Average
AD 25.0% 8.7% 4.8% 12.5% 18.8% 7.1% 12.8% AD 9.4% 8.7% 5.7% 9.4% 20.6% 13.6% 11.2% AD 9.4% 9.8% 5.7% 9.8% 20.5% 13.3% 11.4%
GT 40.0% 28.6% 33.3% 20.0% 33.3% 28.6% 30.6% GT 40.0% 22.9% 10.0% 18.0% 15.0% 12.9% 19.8% GT 40.0% 18.6% 13.3% 14.7% 12.9% 9.0% 18.1%
TFT 10.0% 14.3% 100.0% 100.0% 20.0% 0.0% 40.7% TFT 26.0% 11.4% 48.0% 53.3% 26.0% 0.0% 27.5% TFT 26.0% 12.6% 44.0% 53.3% 26.0% 0.0% 27.0%
AC 28.6% 50.0% 54.5% 81.8% 70.0% 75.0% 60.0% AC 35.0% 60.0% 46.4% 64.5% 49.0% 58.8% 52.3% AC 35.0% 47.9% 44.1% 64.5% 47.0% 56.3% 49.1%
Rep 38.5% 52.6% 58.8% 68.0% 66.7% 72.4% 59.5% Rep 39.2% 45.3% 41.8% 38.0% 48.8% 43.1% 42.7% Rep 39.2% 42.8% 40.9% 34.1% 44.5% 41.1% 40.4%
F-Full treatment
SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 Average SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 Average SG1 SG2 SG3 SG4 SG5 SG6 Average
AD 54.5% 62.5% 46.2% 57.1% 50.0% 50.0% 53.4% AD 58.6% 60.6% 50.0% 57.9% 55.0% 61.7% 57.3% AD 58.6% 62.0% 54.5% 65.2% 60.4% 61.9% 60.4%
GT 76.9% 100.0% 75.0% 62.5% 55.6% 80.0% 75.0% GT 62.7% 84.0% 62.5% 67.5% 58.9% 54.0% 64.9% GT 62.7% 84.5% 65.0% 67.6% 63.3% 52.7% 66.0%
TFT 57.1% 100.0% 75.0% 66.7% 75.0% 66.7% 73.4% TFT 70.0% 75.0% 60.0% 46.7% 67.5% 58.3% 62.9% TFT 70.0% 75.0% 63.8% 45.6% 68.8% 65.6% 64.8%
AC 88.9% 85.7% 87.5% 70.0% 88.9% 66.7% 81.3% AC 85.6% 84.3% 85.0% 77.0% 88.9% 96.7% 86.2% AC 85.6% 84.3% 92.4% 77.7% 88.3% 92.2% 86.7%
Rep 77.8% 75.0% 87.5% 88.9% 93.8% 82.4% 84.2% Rep 78.9% 77.8% 84.5% 87.2% 91.3% 81.2% 83.5% Rep 78.9% 77.9% 83.9% 86.5% 91.1% 80.8% 83.2%
Round 1 First Block All rounds
Round 1 First Block All rounds
Round 1 First Block All rounds
Round 1 First Block All rounds
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Table B.6: Reporting Strategy Choices, Supergame by Supergame (supplementing Fig. 5 of the 
paper) 
This table summarizes the details of the structural estimation results reported in Fig. 5 of the 
paper. See the paper for the definition of each strategy. 
 
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AN 0.549     0.059    9.221    0.000 AN 0.089     0.086    1.026    0.152                
AR 0.047     0.106    0.446    0.328                AR 0.647     0.078    8.247    0.000
CR 0.017     0.039    0.448    0.327                CR 0.033     0.080    0.414    0.339                
IA 0.207     0.028    7.451    0.000                IA 0.053     0.027    1.945    0.026                
RR 0.050     0.097    0.515    0.303                RR 0.131     0.044    2.954    0.002                
PD 0.130     0.062    2.108    0.018                PD 0.046     0.080    0.583    0.280                
Gamma 0.453     Gamma 0.582     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AN 0.604     0.059    10.220  0.000 AN 0.144     0.101    1.419    0.078                
AR 0.025     0.117    0.214    0.415                AR 0.644     0.080    8.059    0.000
CR 0.025     0.030    0.849    0.198                CR 0.000     0.073    0.000    0.500                
IA 0.137     0.038    3.657    0.000                IA 0.035     0.002    16.264  0.000
RR 0.078     0.107    0.729    0.233                RR 0.109     0.039    2.780    0.003                
PD 0.131     0.061    2.156    0.016                PD 0.069     0.068    1.012    0.156                
Gamma 0.445     Gamma 0.479     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AN 0.528     0.042    12.538  0.000 AN 0.160     0.049    3.266    0.001                
AR 0.063     0.113    0.555    0.290                AR 0.543     0.076    7.141    0.000                
CR 0.054     0.049    1.084    0.139                CR 0.041     0.069    0.586    0.279                
IA 0.093     0.040    2.311    0.010                IA 0.000     0.037    0.000    0.500                
RR 0.168     0.096    1.746    0.040                RR 0.213     0.000    > 100 0.000
PD 0.095     0.085    1.116    0.132                PD 0.043     0.082    0.525    0.300                
Gamma 0.417     Gamma 0.419     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AN 0.557     0.057    9.739    0.000 AN 0.116     0.041    2.843    0.002                
AR 0.067     0.110    0.608    0.272                AR 0.677     0.062    10.935  0.000
CR 0.073     0.037    1.985    0.024                CR 0.024     0.075    0.325    0.373                
IA 0.123     0.058    2.119    0.017                IA 0.039     0.037    1.049    0.147                
RR 0.165     0.069    2.401    0.008                RR 0.103     0.031    3.350    0.000                
PD 0.016     0.055    0.286    0.387                PD 0.041     0.078    0.527    0.299                
Gamma 0.507     Gamma 0.385     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AN 0.569 0.057 10.020 0.000 AN 0.181     0.062    2.930    0.002                
AR 0.104 0.115 0.907 0.182 AR 0.664     0.088    7.573    0.000                
CR 0.038 0.046 0.826 0.204 CR 0.063     0.093    0.683    0.247                
IA 0.104 0.041 2.518 0.006 IA 0.000     0.045    0.000    0.500                
RR 0.158 0.113 1.406 0.080 RR 0.092     0.000    > 100 0.000
PD 0.027 0.091 0.296 0.384 PD 0.000     0.071    0.000    0.500                
Gamma 0.486 Gamma 0.519     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AN 0.525     0.070    7.537    0.000                AN 0.083     0.049    1.671    0.047                
AR 0.050     0.122    0.413    0.340                AR 0.723     0.045    16.148  0.000
CR 0.084     0.051    1.634    0.051                CR 0.004     0.067    0.057    0.477                
IA 0.065     0.073    0.889    0.187                IA 0.000     0.016    0.000    0.500                
RR 0.216     0.095    2.283    0.011                RR 0.191     0.000    > 100 0.000
PD 0.059     0.148    0.398    0.345                PD 0.000     0.077    0.000    0.500                
Gamma 0.496     Gamma 0.470     
I. C-Min treatment II. F-Min treatment
a. 1st supergame a. 1st supergame
b. 2nd supergame b. 2nd supergame
c. 3rd supergame c. 3rd supergame
f. 6th supergame f. 6th supergame
d. 4th supergame d. 4th supergame
e. 5th supergamee. 5th supergame
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fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AN 0.498     0.080    6.248    0.000                AN 0.115     0.091    1.270    0.102                
AR 0.050     0.087    0.574    0.283                AR 0.634     0.064    9.833    0.000
CR 0.007     0.049    0.147    0.442                CR 0.014     0.098    0.146    0.442                
IA 0.294     0.044    6.637    0.000                IA 0.000     0.055    0.000    0.500                
RR 0.078     0.128    0.609    0.271                RR 0.089     0.045    1.964    0.025                
PD 0.073     0.062    1.178    0.119                PD 0.148     0.063    2.352    0.009                
Gamma 0.551     Gamma 0.589     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AN 0.505     0.080    6.310    0.000                AN 0.109     0.068    1.592    0.056                
AR 0.089     0.118    0.752    0.226                AR 0.624     0.054    11.553  0.000
CR 0.000     0.045    0.000    0.500                CR 0.055     0.093    0.588    0.278                
IA 0.211     0.017    12.372  0.000 IA 0.024     0.073    0.331    0.370                
RR 0.173     0.110    1.564    0.059                RR 0.113     0.056    2.024    0.021                
PD 0.023     0.096    0.237    0.406                PD 0.076     0.070    1.084    0.139                
Gamma 0.507     Gamma 0.506     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AN 0.413     0.070    5.924    0.000                AN 0.111     0.051    2.202    0.014                
AR 0.109     0.100    1.093    0.137                AR 0.679     0.059    11.561  0.000
CR 0.037     0.059    0.627    0.265                CR 0.044     0.090    0.491    0.312                
IA 0.251     0.040    6.284    0.000                IA 0.017     0.056    0.296    0.384                
RR 0.167     0.123    1.349    0.089                RR 0.068     0.060    1.137    0.128                
PD 0.023     0.110    0.207    0.418                PD 0.081     0.063    1.271    0.102                
Gamma 0.488     Gamma 0.446     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AN 0.396     0.096    4.137    0.000                AN 0.085     0.064    1.327    0.092                
AR 0.164     0.131    1.249    0.106                AR 0.750     0.057    13.121  0.000
CR 0.000     0.083    0.000    0.500                CR 0.000     0.084    0.000    0.500                
IA 0.325     0.015    20.981  -                     IA 0.000     0.033    0.000    0.500                
RR 0.115     0.136    0.848    0.198                RR 0.035     0.000    > 100 0.000
PD 0.000     0.112    0.000    0.500                PD 0.129     0.050    2.575    0.005                
Gamma 0.485     Gamma 0.472     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AN 0.400     0.137    2.924    0.002                AN 0.048     0.066    0.716    0.237                
AR 0.168     0.079    2.134    0.016                AR 0.662     0.039    16.964  0.000
CR 0.047     0.077    0.616    0.269                CR 0.000     0.077    0.000    0.500                
IA 0.131     0.097    1.344    0.090                IA 0.000     0.025    0.000    0.500                
RR 0.185     0.090    2.050    0.020                RR 0.151     0.020    7.531    0.000                
PD 0.069     0.080    0.857    0.196                PD 0.139     0.082    1.710    0.044                
Gamma 0.575     Gamma 0.431     
fraction S.D z p (two-sided) fraction S.D z p (two-sided)
AN 0.465     0.080    5.795    0.000                AN 0.114     0.051    2.258    0.012                
AR 0.162     0.091    1.785    0.037                AR 0.565     0.067    8.397    0.000
CR 0.032     0.075    0.434    0.332                CR 0.000     0.099    0.000    0.500                
IA 0.228     0.040    5.771    0.000                IA 0.022     0.006    3.869    0.000                
RR 0.112     0.112    1.005    0.157                RR 0.068     0.025    2.674    0.004                
PD 0.000     0.080    0.000    0.500                PD 0.231     0.028    8.213    0.000
Gamma 0.502     Gamma 0.501     
III. C-Full treatment IV. F-Full treatment
1st supergame 1st supergame
2nd supergame 2nd supergame
3rd supergame 3rd supergame
6th supergame 6th supergame
4th supergame 4th supergame
5th supergame 5th supergame
42 
 
 
The following summarizes test results to compare subjects’ reporting strategy choices among the 
treatments based on the tables in the previous two pages. 
 (i) % of the subjects who acted according to 
the AN strategy 
 (ii) % of the subjects who acted according to 
the AR strategy 
 C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full  C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full 
C-Min --- .0000*** .2045 .0000***  --- .0000*** .1935 .0000*** 
F-Min --- --- .0000*** .5423  --- --- .0000*** .9796 
C-Full --- --- --- .0000***  --- --- --- .0000*** 
F-Full --- --- --- ---  --- --- --- --- 
 
 
 (iii) % of the subjects who acted 
according to the CR strategy 
 (iv) % of the subjects who acted according to the 
IA strategy 
 C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full  C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full 
C-Min --- .5158 .3838 .3619  --- .0123** .0738* .0111** 
F-Min --- --- .7772 .7215  --- --- .0000*** .5977 
C-Full --- --- --- .9338  --- --- --- .0001*** 
F-Full --- --- --- ---  --- --- --- --- 
 
 
 (v) % of the subjects who acted according 
to the RR strategy 
 (vi) % of the subjects who acted according to the 
PD strategy 
 C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full  C-Min F-Min C-Full F-Full 
C-Min --- .9860 .9866 .3528  --- .2346 .2388 .2845 
F-Min --- --- .9710 .3167  --- --- .9431 .0200** 
C-Full --- --- --- .3503  --- --- --- .0266** 
F-Full --- --- --- ---  --- --- --- --- 
 
 
Notes: The numbers are p-values (two-sided) based on two-sample tests of proportions. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
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Appendix C: Sample Instructions Used in the Experiment 
This part of the Appendix includes instructions for the C-Min and F-Full treatments as examples. 
C.1. The C-Min treatment 
[The following instructions were read aloud to the subjects at the onset of the experiment:] 
Instructions 
You are now taking part in a decision-making experiment. Depending on your decisions and the 
decisions of other participants, you will be able to earn money in addition to the £3 guaranteed 
for your participation. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
     
During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. Please 
switch off all of your electronic devices (e.g., mobile phone). If you have a question, please raise 
your hand.  
        
In the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in points. During the experiment, you can 
accumulate earnings through your decisions explained below. At the end of the experiment, 
points will be converted to UK pounds at the following rate: 
     
150 points = 1 pound. 
   
Your total earnings (including the £3 for participation) will be paid out to you in cash once the 
experiment is over. Your payment will be rounded to the nearest 10 pence (e.g., £12.30 if it is 
£12.33; and £12.40 if it is £12.37). 
   
There are 6 phases in the experiment. In each phase, all participants are randomly divided into 
groups of 8 individuals. This means that you are in a group with 7 other participants and play 
with them in that phase. Once a phase is over, your group composition will randomly change 
(you will be randomly assigned to a group with 7 participants in this room). Each phase consists 
of multiple periods. You will interact with your 7 group members in each period. You will not 
interact with participants outside your group in each period.  No one knows which other 
participants are in their group, and no one will be informed who was in which group after the 
experiment. The following sections will first explain the details of each period in a phase. We 
will then explain the duration of each phase. 
Your decisions in each phase: 
In each phase, participants are randomly given an identification number. However, this is private 
information of participants. All periods have the same structure. At the onset of a given period, 
each participant is randomly matched with a member in his or her group. The pairing is random. 
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Neither your decisions in previous periods in this phase nor your decisions in previous phases 
affect the pairing process. In each period, participants will not be informed of the identification 
numbers of their partners in each period. In other words, you might have already interacted with 
the current partner, or you might not have interacted with that person so far. Since there are 8 
individuals in your group, the probability that you will be matched with the same individual in 2 
consecutive periods of a given phase is 1/7.  
 
Each period consists of two stages. The first stage is an interaction stage. The second stage is a 
reporting-decision stage. 
 
Stage 1: Making binary choice between Y or Z   
At the onset of a given period, you and your partner simultaneously choose Y or Z. As 
both you and your partner make binary choices, there are 4 possible interaction outcomes. The 
earnings consequence of each scenario will be summarized as below: 
(a) If you choose Y and your counterpart also chooses Y, you earn 25 points.  
(b) If you choose Z and your counterpart also chooses Z, you earn 10 points.  
(c) If you choose Y and your counterpart chooses Z, you earn 5 points.  
(d) If you choose Z and your counterpart chooses Y, you earn 30 points.  
Your partner has the same earnings formulas as yours (see also screen shots on the next page). 
 When you make binary choice, you will be informed of your counterpart’s choice of Y or 
Z in the last period if that person’s last interaction counterpart reported that person’s choice (You 
will not be informed of the choice if that person’s last interaction counterpart did not report it). 
No such information is available in period 1 as there is no previous round. We will explain the 
detail of the reporting process in Stage 2 below.   
Once all participants in a session make decisions and click the “Submit” button, you will 
be informed of the outcome of the interactions in a given period. Specifically, you will be 
informed of (1) your partner’s choice and (2) your earnings in that period. 
 
Stage 2: Choosing whether to report your counterpart’s action 
 Once you review the interaction outcome in Stage 1, you will be asked to decide whether 
you wish to report your interaction counterpart’s choice, Y or Z, to that person’s next-period 
interaction counterpart. Reporting is costly. If you report it in a given period, one point will be 
deducted from your payoff at the end of that period. If you do not report it, no points will be 
deducted.   
If you decide to report it in period t, the counterpart’s next-period counterpart will make 
binary choice of Y or Z in period t + 1 knowing that the partner selected Y or Z in the interaction 
with you in period t.  
By contrast, if you decide not to report it in period t, the counterpart’s next-period 
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counterpart will not be informed of the counterpart’s choice when making decision in period t + 1. 
 
An Example of Computer Screen 1: (when making decisions)  
 
Note: Period 2. Decisions here are for illustration only. 
 
An Example of Computer Screen 2: (the outcome screen)  
 
 
Note: Period 2. Decisions here are for illustration only. 
Period 2 result was added in 
the summary table. 
You were informed of the matched counterpart’s last-
period choice (Y in this example) because that 
counterpart’s last-period interaction partner reported it. 
Your matched counterpart learned 
your last-period choice (Z in this 
example) because your last-period 
counterpart reported it. 
These two columns show your and your counterpart’s choices. 
These two columns show what 
information you and your counterpart 
had in selecting either Y or Z.  
You selected Z in period 1. Your period 1 
counterpart reported it. Thus, your period 2 
counterpart knew your period 1 choice (Z). 
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An Example of Computer Screen 3: (the reporting decision) 
 
Note: Decisions here are for illustration only. 
The Number of Periods in Each Phase: 
The number of periods is not predetermined. The probability that you will have another 
period in a given phase is 95%. Specifically, at the end of each period, the computer randomly 
draws an integer between 1 and 100 for this session. If the drawn integer is less than or equal to 
95, your interaction in the present phase continues. If the drawn integer is greater than 95, then 
the present phase is over.  
Nevertheless, the experimental procedure is different. Operationally, you will play blocks of 10 
periods in sequence as follows: 
 
1. At the onset of a given phase, you will play 10 periods, assuming the random continuation rule 
described above. In each period, you will randomly be paired with an individual in your group 
and will interact with each other by selecting Y or Z. However, you will not be informed of an 
integer randomly drawn in each period until the end of the tenth period. 
 
2. Once you finish the interaction in period 10, you will be informed of integers randomly drawn 
in all the 10 periods. For example suppose that the ten randomly drawn integers were: 1, 84, 
34, 56, 32, 3, 72, 45, 14, 32 in sequence. In this situation, you will move on to the next block 
of 10 periods because the ten randomly drawn integers were all less than or equal to 95. In 
each period in the next block, you will be randomly paired with an individual in your group 
and will interact with each other as in the previous block; once you play the ten interactions, 
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you will be informed of ten realized integers at the end of the 10 periods, as in the previous 
block. 
For another example suppose that the ten randomly drawn integers were: 4, 34, 98, 56, 
32, 93, 2, 45, 14, 32 in sequence. In this situation, your total payoff in this phase is calculated 
by your interaction outcomes and costs of reporting in periods 1 to 3 because an integer greater 
than 95 was first realized at the end of period 3. Your interaction outcomes and costs for 
reporting from period 4 will not be counted in calculating your total payoff in that phase; and 
you will not move on to the next block of 10 periods in the phase. Instead you will move on to 
the next phase, will be randomly given a new identification number, and will be randomly 
assigned to a group of 8. The nature of interactions in the next phase is exactly the same as the 
present one. 
 
Mathematically, since the probability that you have the next period is 95%, the expected number 
of periods that are used for payment in a given phase is 20 periods. However, since the decision 
to discontinue your interactions in each phase is randomly exerted by the computer, you may 
have a phase with valid periods that are much longer or shorter than 20. In case that the total 
number of periods across the six phases reaches 220 (it could happen although the likelihood is 
very small), the experiment will be finished due to operational reasons (the experiment duration 
becomes longer than what was announced in the recruiting message for this experiment). 
Your Earnings: 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid privately based on your accumulated earnings 
across the six phases.  
 
If you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand. If all questions have been 
answered, we will move on to the experiment. 
Comprehension questions: 
Please answer the following questions to check your understanding of the instructions. Please 
raise your hand if you have any questions.  
 
1. How many phases do you have?    ___________________ 
 
2. How many individuals are there in your group in a given phase?   ___________________ 
 
3. Suppose that you choose Y and your partner chooses Z in a period of a given phase. What are 
your earnings in that period? What are your partner’s earnings in that period? 
 
a) Your earnings ___________________ 
 
48 
 
b) Your partner’s earnings ___________________ 
 
4. How much does it cost you to report your interaction partner’s choice to that partner’s next 
interaction partner? 
_______________ 
 
5. What is the probability that your interaction continues within your group in a given period? 
_______________ 
 
Any questions? 
 
[Once everyone finished answering the comprehension questions and the experimenter explained 
the answers, the experiment began.] 
 
C.2. The F-Full treatment 
[The following instructions were read aloud to the subjects at the onset of the experiment:] 
Instructions 
You are now taking part in a decision-making experiment. Depending on your decisions and the 
decisions of other participants, you will be able to earn money in addition to the £3 guaranteed 
for your participation. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
     
During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. Please 
switch off all of your electronic devices (e.g., mobile phone). If you have a question, please raise 
your hand.  
        
In the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in points. During the experiment, you can 
accumulate earnings through your decisions as explained below. At the end of the experiment, 
points will be converted to UK pounds at the following rate: 
     
150 points = 1 pound. 
   
Your total earnings (including the £3 for participation) will be paid out to you in cash once the 
experiment is over. Your payment will be rounded to the nearest 10 pence (e.g., £12.30 if it is 
£12.33; and £12.40 if it is £12.37). 
   
There are 6 phases in the experiment. In each phase, all participants are randomly divided into 
groups of 8 individuals. This means that you are in a group with 7 other participants and play 
with them in that phase. Once a phase is over, your group composition will randomly change 
(you will be randomly assigned to a group with 7 participants in this room). Each phase consists 
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of multiple periods. You will interact with the 7 group members in each period. You will not 
interact with participants outside your group in each period.  No one knows which other 
participants are in their group, and no one will be informed who was in which group after the 
experiment. The following sections will first explain the details of each period in a phase. We 
will then explain the duration of each phase. 
Your decisions in each phase: 
In each phase, participants are randomly given an identification number. However, this is private 
information of participants. All periods have the same structure. At the onset of a given period, 
each participant is randomly matched with a member in his or her group. The pairing is random. 
Neither your decisions in previous periods in this phase nor your decisions in previous phases 
affect the pairing process. Participants will not be informed of the identification numbers of their 
partners in each period. In other words, you might have already interacted with the current 
partner, or you might not have interacted with that person so far. Since there are 8 individuals in 
your group, the probability that you will be matched with the same individual in 2 consecutive 
periods of a given phase is 1/7.  
 
Each period consists of two stages. The first stage is an interaction stage. The second stage is a 
reporting-decision stage. 
 
Stage 1: Making binary choice between Y or Z   
At the onset of a given period, you and your partner simultaneously choose Y or Z. As 
both you and your partner make binary choices, there are 4 possible interaction outcomes. The 
earnings consequence of each scenario will be summarized as below: 
(a) If you choose Y and your counterpart also chooses Y, you earn 25 points.  
(b) If you choose Z and your counterpart also chooses Z, you earn 10 points.  
(c) If you choose Y and your counterpart chooses Z, you earn 5 points.  
(d) If you choose Z and your counterpart chooses Y, you earn 30 points.  
Your partner has the same earnings formulas as yours (see also the screen shots on the next 
page). 
 When you make binary choice, you will be informed of your counterpart’s choices of Y 
or Z in the previous periods in that given phase if that person’s interaction counterparts reported 
that person’s choices (You will not be informed of the choices that counterpart made in periods 
where that person’s interaction counterparts did not report). You will learn the average 
percentage in which the counterpart selected Y in the past based on the reporting. For example, 
suppose that it is now in period 8. Also suppose that your counterpart’s interaction partners in 
periods 1, 4, and 7 reported the choices your counterpart made in those periods. Also suppose 
that that counterpart selected Y, Z and Y in those three periods. Then you will be informed that 
your counterpart’s frequency of selecting Y is 66.7%, along with the counterparts’ choices in 
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periods 1, 4 and 7. Such information is not available in period 1 as there is no previous round. 
We will explain the detail of the reporting process in Stage 2 below.   
Once all participants in a session make decisions and click the “Submit” button, you will 
be informed of the outcome of the interactions in a given period. Specifically, you will be 
informed of (1) your partner’s choice and (2) your earnings in that period. 
 
Stage 2: Choosing whether to report your counterpart’s action 
 Once you review the interaction outcome in Stage 1, you will be asked to decide whether 
you wish to report your interaction counterpart’s choice, Y or Z, to that person’s future-period 
interaction counterparts. Reporting would not cost you. 
If you decide to report it in period t, the counterpart’s interaction counterparts in all 
periods after period t will be informed of that choice before making binary choice of Y or Z.  
By contrast, if you decide not to report it in period t, the counterpart’s future counterparts 
will not be informed of the period t counterpart’s choice when making binary decision of Y or Z. 
 
An Example of Computer Screen 1: (when making decisions)  
 
 
Note: Period 5. Decisions here are for illustration only. 
    
You will be informed of the matched counterpart’s past choices in some periods 
because that counterpart’s interaction partners reported them in the respective periods. 
In this example, this person has been reported in periods 1 and 3 
The information regarding your past 
interaction outcomes is available in 
this table. 
You were informed (a) how many times your 
counterpart has been reported by his/her previous 
interaction partners; and (b) average choices based 
on reporting. 
Your interaction counterparts in periods 2 and 3 have reported your 
choices. Thus, your period 5 counterpart is informed that you 
selected Y 50% of the time, along with these two specific past 
choices. 
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An Example of Computer Screen 2: (the outcome screen)  
 
 
Note: Period 5. Decisions here are for illustration only. 
 
An Example of Computer Screen 3: (the reporting decision) 
 
Note: Period 5. Decisions here are for illustration only. 
Period 5 result was added in 
the summary table. 
 
If you report it, all future partners of this counterpart will learn his/her choice (Y in this example) in 
this period. 
If you do not report it, any person matched with this counterpart in future rounds will not learn 
his/her choice (Y in this example) in this period. 
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The Number of Periods in Each Phase: 
The number of periods is not predetermined. The probability that you will have another 
period in a given phase is 95%. Specifically, at the end of each period, the computer randomly 
draws an integer between 1 and 100 for this session. If the drawn integer is less than or equal to 
95, your interaction in the present phase continues. If the drawn integer is greater than 95, then 
the present phase is over.  
Nevertheless, the experimental procedure is different. Operationally, you will play blocks of 10 
periods in sequence as follows: 
 
1. At the onset of a given phase, you will play 10 periods, assuming the random continuation rule 
described above. In each period, you will randomly be paired with an individual in your group 
and will interact with each other by selecting Y or Z. However, you will not be informed of an 
integer randomly drawn in each period until the end of the tenth period. 
 
2. Once you finish the interaction in period 10, you will be informed of integers randomly drawn 
in all the 10 periods. For example, suppose that the ten randomly drawn integers were: 1, 84, 
34, 56, 32, 3, 72, 45, 14, 32 in sequence. In this situation, you will move on to the next block 
of 10 periods because the ten randomly drawn integers were all less than or equal to 95. In 
each period in the next block, you will be randomly paired with an individual in your group 
and will interact with each other as in the previous block; once you play the ten interactions, 
you will be informed of the ten realized integers at the end of the 10 periods, as in the previous 
block. 
For another example, suppose that the ten randomly drawn integers were: 4, 34, 98, 56, 
32, 93, 2, 45, 14, 32 in sequence. In this situation, your total payoff in this phase is calculated 
by your interaction outcomes in periods 1 to 3 because an integer greater than 95 was first 
realized at the end of period 3. Your interaction outcomes from period 4 will not be counted in 
calculating your total payoff in that phase; and you will not move on to the next block of 10 
periods in the phase. Instead you will move on to the next phase, will be randomly given a new 
identification number, and will be randomly assigned to a group of 8. The nature of 
interactions in the next phase is exactly the same as the present one. 
 
Mathematically, since the probability that you have the next period is 95%, the expected number 
of periods that are used for payment in a given phase is 20 periods. However, since the decision 
to discontinue your interactions in each phase is randomly exerted by the computer, you may 
have a phase with valid periods that are much longer or shorter than 20. In case that the total 
number of periods across the six phases reaches 220 (it could happen although the likelihood is 
very small), the experiment will be finished due to operational reasons (the experiment duration 
becomes longer than what was announced in the recruiting message for this experiment). 
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Your Earnings: 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid privately based on your accumulated earnings 
across the six phases.  
 
If you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand. If all questions have been 
answered, we will move on to the experiment. 
Comprehension questions: 
Please answer the following questions to check your understanding of the instructions. Please 
raise your hand if you have any questions.  
 
1. How many phases do you have?    ___________________ 
 
2. How many individuals are there in your group in a given phase?   ___________________ 
 
3. Suppose that you choose Y and your partner chooses Z in a period of a given phase. What are 
your earnings in that period? What are your partner’s earnings in that period? 
 
a) Your earnings ___________________ 
 
b) Your partner’s earnings ___________________ 
 
4. How much does it cost you to report your interaction partner’s choice to that partner’s future 
interaction partners? 
_______________ 
 
5. What is the probability that your interaction continues within your group in a given period? 
_______________ 
 
Any questions? 
 
[Once everyone finished answering the comprehension questions and the experimenter explained 
the answers, the experiment began.] 
 
 
